[2.2. Agro-Joint work with Jews according to NEP:
Resettlement of Jewish "lishentsy" for being farmers since
1928 - first 5 year plan and collectivization crisis
1929-1930]
[Since 1921: Russia's New
Economic Policies (NEP) with hope for private Jewish
traders]
The phase of palliative relief was passing; in 1921 the
government had introduced the new economic policies (NEP),
designed to give the country an opportunity to regain some of
its strength by a partial restoration of capitalism (under
careful government surveillance) before any further
socialization was attempted. Trading was permitted now, and
small shops could employ a limited number of workers. In
agriculture the difference between the poor, the average, and
the "rich" peasant - the kulak - grew. The Jewish trader and
artisan could therefore hope for at least some respite and a
chance, however slender, to earn his living.
[Poverty in White Russia and
Ukraine - Rosen wants them bring into the towns - foundation
of Agro-Joint]
Nevertheless, the situation was very difficult. Starvation or
extreme poverty prevailed in many parts of White Russia and
the Ukraine, where many Jews were still living in the
shtetlach, the small towns of what had been the Jewish Pale of
Settlement under the czarist regime. Rosen suggested that a
large-scale colonization program be started to save thousands
of Jews from degrading poverty by taking them out of the
little towns, where most of them would have no work in any
case. There had been Jewish agricultural colonies in Russia
ever since the period of Alexander I, in the early nineteenth
century. Prior to 1914 some 15,000 families lived in them.
After the fog of war had lifted, about 10,000 families still
lived in what now came to be called the "old" colonies in
White Russia and the Ukraine. Help was extended to them, and,
by agreement with the Soviet government, new colonies were
founded. Up to 1924 some 500 families were so settled under an
experimental program. The experiment was held to be
successful, and on July 17, 1924, the American Jewish Joint
Agricultural Corporation (Agro-Joint) was founded.
Rosen became its president. Financial control was vested in a
number of trustees appointed by JDC, who held all the stock in
the new corporation.
[1924-1928: 5,646 families
settled by Agro-Joint in cooperation with COMZET and OZET]
Under Rosen's direction, 5,646 families were settled between
1924 and 1928, some in the Ukraine, some in the Crimea.
This settlement work was done in conjunction with two
organizations: COMZET, the government-sponsored committee for
settling Jews on land, and OZET, a quasi-voluntary
organization to recruit and screen candidates for settlement.
[COMZET under Peter
Smidovich]
The head of COMZET was a non-Jewish vice-premier of the
Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, Peter Smidovich, a man who
was very much interested in the success of the venture. He was
influential in obtaining the government's agreement to the
Jewish settlement of a large tract of land in the Crimea; as
much as one million acres were set aside for use by Jewish
settlers.
[Jewish section of the CP
"Yevsektsia" against Jewish settlements - settlements in
White Russia - possibilities in the upper Volga and in the
northern Caucasus]
It seems that this agreement was not accepted with enthusiasm
by some Jewish Communists, especially by those who ran the
Jewish section of the Communist party, known as the
Yevsektsia. One feels a constant undercurrent of opposition to
the very idea of a foreign capitalist organization being
allowed to engage in agricultural settlement in Russia.
It was probably owing to this attitude that the local
Yevsektsia in White Russia made an attempt to have
agricultural settlement directed there. At the same time, in
1924/5, other settlement possibilities were investigated in
the upper Volga region and the northern Caucasus.
(End note 1: In:
-- Na agrarnom fronte, 1925, nos. 5-6;
-- Sobrania Zakonov, 1925, no. 69; 1928, no. 21)
[Jewish settlements on the
Crimea partly with Hebrew names as a step for Palestine -
JDC and ICA]
It is an indubitable fact that the settlements in the Crimea
(p.60)
founded by the Agro-Joint included a number of Zionist
colonies settled by people who saw the Crimea as a
stepping-stone on the road to Palestine. There were some 13 of
these with Hebrew names, some of them - like Tel Chai (there
were two separate settlements by that name), Mishmar, Khaklai,
Avoda, Kheruth, Maaian, Kadimah - having distinct
Palestine-centered connotations.
In 1928 there were 112 Agro-Joint colonies in the Ukraine and
105 in the Crimea. In addition to these, Agro-Joint also
helped other colonies with occasional loans or by other means.
ICA [Jewish Colonization Association] renewed its support of
the establishment of agricultural colonies as well, also
dealing with some of the older colonies, where work had been
started in prewar days. By 1928 ICA had settled 1,769 new
Jewish families on the soil, and by 1930/1 they had spent some
$ 4 million on this venture.
[1926: Professions of the
Jewish population in Russia]
The period of the NEP was not accompanied by any easing for
the economic situation of the Jews, expect for a small group
of traders - the so-called NEPmen. The number of Jews employed
as workers in factories had not grown significantly since
prewar days, when it had been a mere 46,000. According to 1926
figures, which included some 80% of the Jewish population,
only 14.7% of the Jews were factory workers; 24% were
employees, 23.9% were artisans, 14.2% were traders, and 16.8%
were defined as having no definite occupation, being
permanently unemployed or "miscellaneous";
(End note 2: AJ, Grower memorandum, 4/26/29 [26 April 1929])
5.9 % of the Jews were peasants.
[Since 1917: Definition of
"Enemies of the people" (lishentsy) - traders, ill-defined
occupations, Jewish artisans]
The Soviet government deprived of civil rights all those whom
it defined as its class enemies. These people were called
lishentsy. They were not
allowed to occupy any administrative position, they were
excluded from all social and medical services, and their
children could not go to state schools, This category included
all those who were not "productively occupied". Apart from
traders and people of ill-defined occupation, Jewish artisans
were also included in this category of déclassés because they
employed one apprentice or more.
Since many of the employees were out of work, a large
proportion of the Jewish population were in dire straits. Dr.
Ezechiel (p.61)
A. Grower, a close associate of Rosen's and a member of the
Agro-Joint board, estimated the number of Jewish déclassés at
830,000.
[Jewish Communists in Russia
are aiming to destroy the Jewish middle class]
The attitude of the Soviet regime was not tinged by
anti-Semitism at that time; but it just so happened that the
Jews had been the traditional middle class in Russia, and the
Russians' new policies were directed against the middle class.
Jewish Communists, who tended to be more "orthodox" than their
non-Jewish comrades, bore down heavily on their fellow Jews.
[1927/8: Stalin's regime
needs an agreement with the Jews - agreement with JDC -
dollars and machinery]
At this juncture Russia came forward with the idea of a vast
expansion of the Jewish colonization scheme and offered the
Jews large tracts of land, especially in the Crimea. In 1927/8
it was obviously interested in transforming the Jewish
population into a productive and loyal force. It also needed
grain, and the establishment and encouragement of state farms
(
sovkhozy), which
were set up on state lands, had so far not been very
successful. Moreover, Soviet Russia needed American dollars
very badly, and an arrangement with JDC meant not only a
contribution to the solution of the pressing Jewish problem,
but also an influx of both hard currency and valuable
machinery, of which the Soviets were very short.
[Rosen wants all Russian Jews
to stay in Russia - all Jews should become peasants - and
get their rights back]
One of the social problems that Rosen desired to help solve in
an expanded program of land settlement was the question of the
lishentsy. "The
Jewish masses in Russia", said Rosen, "whether they wish it or
not, must remain in their country." The most constructive plan
for adapting large numbers of Jews to the new conditions in
Russia had been found to be agricultural settlement, whereas
by contrast, the position of the tradesmen and middlemen in
the present economic structure of Russia was utterly hopeless.
(End note 3: AJ 39, 3/30/28 [30 March 1928], pp.1-2)
In the colonies, according to Soviet law, the
lishenets would be
allowed to regain his civil rights by the simple process of
becoming a peasant, a productive member of the society. This
was also in the best interests of the government, and again a
mutual understanding could easily be reached. The achievements
up to 1928 seemed to warrant this expansion of the program.
(p.62)
(End note 4:
The statistics regarding Jews in Russian agriculture are
contradictory. According to the 1926 census, there were about
150,000 Jewish peasants and their families. Dr. Grower's
report of September 1929, however, mentions 130,557 persons
(AJ 64). A report of March 1928 quotes the figure of 35,514
Jewish families, which multiplied by four to account for
family members would give a figure of about 150,000. But it
seems that the statistics included thousands of small Jewish
holdings on the outskirts of villages in the Pale of
Settlement, which should not really be included in statistics
of farmers. The numbers settled by Agro-Joint also appear
uncertain. In March 1928, Agro-Joint claimed to have settled
10,000 families, yet another compilation quoted a figure of
7,600 by the end of 1928. A report of September 1929 mentions
12,988 families as having been settled by Agro-Joint (AJ 39,
AJ2). Here the figures seem to include those Jewish colonists
not in Agro-Joint colonies who were helped by Agro-Joint at
various times. The 5,646 families in the text is the lowest
figure).
[1928: Jewish families
resettled by the Agro-Joint]
It appears that by the end of 1928 the Agro-Joint had settled
about 6,000 Jewish families in its colonies. Some 10,000 more
were living in the old colonies, and an additional few 1,000
were being supported by ICA, ORT, and Ozet. Some 12 to 15,000
other holdings seem to have been of the kind that would
normally be described as garden or vegetable plots. The total
population of the Jewish colonies was therefore about 100,000.
[1928: "US" Jews with German
with Reform synagogues descent have big plans for Soviet
Jews]
Early in 1928 Rosen put the proposal to enlarge colonization
activities before the JDC leadership. This came at a time when
the economic prosperity in the United States, present and
future, was not in doubt, at least not in business circles.
The business of the United States was indeed business, and
investment capital was looking for outlets. Philanthropy was
flourishing too, and the rich families of German Jewish
descent were following a modern version of a very ancient
Jewish tradition by giving generously (from money partly
deducted from their taxes) to various good causes. They
were liberals in the 1848 tradition, dues-paying members of
important Reform synagogues, who hoped that nationalism was
dying and would be replaced by equality of opportunity and
brotherhood of man; and they felt that Jews ought to be loyal
and equal citizens of their respective countries.
A Rousseauean and romantic tradition made them especially
enthusiastic about agricultural schemes. This was applied to
the Russian situation, and the fact that the government was
Bolshevik made no difference. Provided the leadership was
sincere and the Jews would really be granted equality of
opportunity, the project was likely to be accepted.
[1926: Rosenberg's appeal for
help for Russian Jews - otherwise Jewry in Russia would
collapse - support be Warburg]
James N. Rosenberg wrote in 1926 that
considering how much money the
JDC has spent in the past 10 years, and how small a
proportion went to Russia, I maintain that Russia stands
first. If we fail to continue this work for the Jews in
Russia, it will be an incalculably tragic Jewish defeat. The
Jews whom we have helped, and are helping in the other
portions of Europe, have had a bad enough time, but which of
them have gone through anything like the tragedy of the last
century, as the Jews (p. 63)
of Russia? Kishineff, the terrible Gomel pogroms, the
Beiliss case, the World War, military occupations, civil
war, revolt, Petlura, Denikin, bandits, pestilence, famine.
The Spanish Inquisition and the bondage in Egypt were second
to these [Bondage in Egypt is not right according to new
Jewish archeology]. Today these Jews feel a hope. They feel
that hope through colonization, and it is their only hope.
It is voiced pathetically, but with noble dignity and
without any cheap asking for money anywhere. Nowhere have I
been pestered or begged for money. They have simply
described the situation to me. If we fail these Jews, it
will be a collapse of dreadful significance."
(End note 5: AJ 2, 5/26/26 [26 May 1926])
There was no possibility of emigration, and in 1925 Rosen
called it a "mockery to talk about emigration".
(End note 6: AJ 51)
Add to that the power of Rosen's personality, his intimate
knowledge of Russia, his humanitarianism, his agricultural
expertise, his business acumen and simple common sense - and
the outcome was clear. Felix M. Warburg for one, was a
faithful Rosen admirer: "Looking back upon the work during the
last few years, I feel that the Russian experiment has been
the one original piece of work for social improvement that has
been done, but whenever I try to tell you that I admire you
tremendously for what you have done, you blush and change the
subject."
(End note 7: AJ 19, F.M. Warburg to J.A. Rosen, 12/17/30 [17
December 1930])
[Rosenwald and others give 10
mio. $ for the Russian Jews]
The major financial power in the circle of JDC's friends was
Julius Rosenwald, the anti-Zionist Chicago millionaire who was
the architect of the Sears Roebuck empire. Rosenwald, who
hated ostentatiousness, was determined to use his money to
good purpose, according to his lights. He agreed to provide
five-eighths of any sum that might be collected for the
Russian venture. The ultimate goal was $ 10 million for ten
years, but the immediate aim was the collection of $ 8
million; by late 1928, some $ 7.1 million had been subscribed,
Julius Rosenwald pledging $ 5 million (provided the ceiling of
$ 8 million in subscriptions was reached), Warburg $ 1
million, and the Rockefeller Foundation $ 500,000 as an
outright gift.
The money did not come out of JDC collections, but by private
arrangement from a limited number of large subscribers who
were canvassed quietly by a handful of key individuals. This
procedure was used so as to avoid a head-on clash with the
Zionists and their (p.64)
supporters, as well as to prevent a public discussion.
[4 Oct 1928: Rosenberg states
colonizations in Russia and Palestine are equal]
In a letter dated October 4, 1928, Rosenberg claimed that
there was no contradiction between supporting settlement in
Palestine and in supporting it in Russia.
(End note 8: AJ 81, to Alfred W. Saperston)
"Both movements deserved support. The colonization in Russia
has resulted in over 100,000 Jews going to the soil, where
most of them are already self-supporting farmers." But
Rosenberg added a significant comment: "Those who know the
situation in Palestine realistically must all agree that it is
impossible to have a rapid, large-scale colonization in
Palestine." In the meantime, Rosenberg claimed, Jews in Russia
must be saved from starvation and ruin.
[Summer 1928: Rosenberg's
attempt for support by the ICA is in vain]
In preparing to weather the expected storm of opposition, JDC
attempted to enlist the support of ICA for this new program.
In the summer of 1928, Rosenberg initiated an attempt to get
ICA to contribute $ 1 million to the new scheme, without, of
course, attaining any control over the actual operation. It
seems that ICA was negotiating in Moscow at the same time that
Rosen was. But the conservative ICA directorate did not carry
the matter any further, and nothing came of the attempt to
gain ICA's support for the venture.
[August 1928 appr.:
Foundation of the American Society for Jewish Farm
Settlement in Russia (AMSOJEFS)]
The money was acquired by a new company that was formed for
that purpose - the American Society for Jewish Farm Settlement
in Russia (AMSOJEFS). JDC appointed a Board of Directors for
that fund-raising organization, and James N. Rosenberg became
chairman. On January 21, 1929, an agreement was signed with
the Soviet government that provided that until 1935 AMSOJEFS
was to advance $ 900,000 yearly for the agreed purpose of
settling Jews on the land. This money was seen as a loan, and
in return AMSOJEFS would receive USSR government bonds bearing
5 % interest. IN addition, $ 100,000 a year would be paid for
so-called nonreturnable expenses (not as a loan), such as
administrative outlays. For its part, the Soviet government
guaranteed to put up 500,000 rubles for the Agro-Joint
settlements each year and place this budget at the disposal of
the Agro-Joint.
[1921: Lenin offers natural
resources for help of the anti-Soviet West - the West gives
only little response]
There were several unique features about this agreement. In
(p.65)
1921 the Soviet government had, under Lenin, offered
concessions in Soviet Russia for the exploitation and
development of mines, forests, and other natural resources.
But there had been little response from an anti-Soviet West.
[1928/9: Soviet Union needs
international currency and accepts the JDC settlement
program]
Now, with the Agro-Joint, the Soviets reverted to their
earlier offer. However, not only did they pledge to return
almost all of the amount loaned to them in dollars or gold and
to pay interest, but they actually appropriated sums in
Russian money to be administered by a foreign organization.
The reasons for this attitude can only be guessed:
-- a desperate shortage of foreign currency,
-- a wish to foster good relations with rich American
interests,
-- a genuine desire to promote Jewish colonization,
-- and the chance to import seeds and machinery with the money
thus advanced.
Yet, it must be added, this liberal policy was possible only
in 1928/9, before the full weight of the five-year plans
descended on the Soviet Union.
[1927: Trotsky banned - 1929:
Trotsky driven out of the SU]
The quarrel between the factions in the Communist party had
reached its height in the late 1920s. The left wing,
advocating a working-class dictatorship over the peasants (who
had to be subjected to expropriation in order to provide the
wherewithal for a rise in the proletariat's standard of
living), had suffered a defeat. Trotsky was exiled to Soviet
Asia in 1927 and left the Soviet Union in 1929. The
worker-peasant coalition, the
smychka, advocated by Lenin, remained the
official policy of the party. Rosen, closely following the
events in Moscow, cabled in 1928 that Stalin's influence was
waning, that the collectives were a passing fad, and that the
Right would increase its influence.
(End note 9: AJ 19 (confidential, hereafter CON), 1928
[1927 appr.: Plan of an
agreement between JDC and the SU regime]
Under these conditions, it seemed safe to enter into an
agreement with the Soviet government in the hope that no great
upheavals were in prospect.
Rosen's views were also reflected in a communication by Joseph
C. Hyman to Morris D. Waldman of the American Jewish
Committee: "Irrespective of the attempts made elsewhere for
collectivization, I am very definitely of the opinion that, so
far as the Crimea goes, where the bulk of our Society work and
future operations are concerned, the collectivization
experiment will not work real hardships on our colonies."
(p.66)
(End note 10: AJ 82, 12/11/29 [11 December 1929])
The possibility that masses of Jews would be absorbed into
Soviet industry, an obvious result of Soviet industrialization
if it succeeded, was hardly considered. In fact, Dr.
Grower said that most Jews would have to become artisans (
kustars) because it was
obvious that the majority of the Jews could not possibly
become workers.
(End note 11: AJ 2, 4/26/29 [26 April 1929])
In a sense, the policy of JDC in Russia was to follow rather
closely the example of JDC work in Poland under Dr. Kahn.
[8 years agreement between
JDC and SU regime for Jewish settlements]
(p.88-89)
[1928: 5 years plan of Stalin
regime sweeps off all plans of the JDC]
All these intentions and preparations were overthrown by two
events - the launching of the first five-year plan in Russia
and the economic crisis in the United States. Rosen's
prediction had proved wrong. The Right - Bukharin, Tomski,
Rykov - had become weaker, and Stalin's center group adopted
an audacious and brilliant plan for Soviet Russia to pull
herself out of her economic difficulties by her own
bootstraps.
The background and aims of the five-year plan have been
related too often to bear repetition. However, it should be
emphasized that the original concept did not envisage a sudden
transition to collectivisation, but planned for a gradual
transformation, with 25 % of Soviet Russian farmers' families
being brought into cooperatives by 1932/3. The farmers were to
be convinced by propaganda, and at the same time there were to
be enforced grain collections that would permit the country to
buy abroad the machinery and expertise to enable them develop
vast heavy industry projects in Gorky, Stalingrad, Kharkov,
and other places. These new factories would include
tractor-producing plants (Stalingrad and Kharkov) that would
supply machinery to the collective and state farms and thus
insure a higher salable grain yield. This in turn would
increase exports and the industrialization of the country
would proceed.
[Since Nov 1929: Effects of
the stock exchange crash for Stalin's 5 years plan: Fall of prices for grain - more
grain export for the same machinery import]
There were several preconditions for the success of this
venture, one of the chief ones being relative price stability
in the capitalist world. This condition could not be met: the
1929 depression began in the United States more or less at the
same time (October) that the first large-scale steps to
implement the five-year plan in Russia were being taken. The
depression spread quickly to other countries. It caused a
catastrophic fall in all prices, but industrial prices fell
(p.67)
less than those of agricultural products. Russia now had to
export more grain to buy the same amount of machinery.
[First 5 years plan: Kulaks
are driven out]
Moreover, control by the Communist party over their
enthusiastic agents sent out into the field was far from
complete. They were fanatic competition with each other, and
class warfare was practiced in the villages by teams of agents
(mostly young party members from the towns, students, and even
high school pupils). The kulaks were driven out, subjected to
expropriation, exiled, arrested, beaten up.
[First 5 years plan: Agro
joint colonies keep intact]
All this did not affect the new Agro-Joint colonies to any
great degree, because they had accepted certain cooperative
practices from the outset. There were even some communes that
practiced a far greater degree of collectivity than the
cooperative villages (
kokhozy)
set up by the party.
[First 5 years plan: Chase of
kulaks in the old Jewish colonies - and the distructive
effect]
But in the old Jewish colonies kulaks had to be found - even
if there were none. An ICA representative gives us a
description of such proceedings in a report he wrote to his
organization:
This liquidation is entrusted
first to a special delegation of communistic workmen sent to
all the corners of Russia. This delegation, composed of
three persons, arrives at the colony, assembles the poor
elements, keeps them shut in all night, and, at 5 o'clock in
the morning ordinarily, sends them into the houses of
colonists designated in advance. Veritable platoons of
execution are thus formed, going to the houses of the
"kulaki" carrying communist flags and singing the
Internationale. Arriving on the spot, always at 5 o'clock in
the morning, they proceed to the complete expropriation of
all that belongs to the designated victim, carry off all the
furniture, tear from those asleep, old people as well as
children, the very sheets of their beds to the very last
pillow, leaving the old people and the children on the bare
floor and leaving for the needs of the family hardly enough
flour - should there be any - only for three days. Mostly,
the "kulaki" are expelled from their houses and obliged to
leave the district within three days. The "kulak" is robbed
of all his goods and, in three-quarters of the cases, is far
from being an exploiter, is far from having employed hired
help, being in all a more industrious and laborious colonist
than the others. He may also be designated as a "kulak" for
having at a time long past been engaged in some commerce or
other in addition to agriculture. (p.68)
(End note 12: AJ 160, Mirkin memorandum, 2/12/30 [12
February 1930])
[1929-1930: Collectives are
torpedoed by the rich who are destroying their livestock and
eating them]
The result was disastrous. Between October 1929 and March 1930
some 14,000,000 peasant holdings were united in collectives,
mostly against the peasants' will. Of these peasants, only the
poorer elements were interested in the kolkhozy. Many of the
others, forced to enter the collectives, killed off their
draft animals and other livestock because from now on the
state would be looking after them in any case. A very high
proportion of the livestock was literally eaten up.
[2 March 1930: Stalins
decision that collectives are voluntary - 10 mio. peasant
families leave the collectives - hatred against the state's
programs]
Stalin intervened in this situation, and, in an article in
Pravda on March 2, 1930,
laid down a new line, or rather a retreat from the original
concept: collectives were to be voluntary and people could
leave them freely. the result was that about 10,000,000
peasant families left the kokhozy between March and May. The
enmity toward the collectives and toward the government was
such that the peasants, the Ukrainian peasants especially,
deeply resented any person who, for whatever reason, stayed on
in their collectives.
[1929: 79 new settlements by
AMSOJEFS]
The period of collectivization coincided with the beginning of
the expansion of Jewish agricultural settlement by the
AMSOJEFS and the Agro-Joint. In 1929 79 new groups were
settled in the Crimea and three more in the Ukraine. The total
number of families settled was 2,276.
(End note 13: AJ 11. Yet a report by Rosen on 2/13/30 claims
that over 3,000 families had been settled in 1929 (AJ 2). The
lower figure has been accepted as nearer to the truth).
Rosen watched the scene anxiously; his personal sympathies
were Menshevik, and he had a great deal of criticism of the
regime. Naturally, he tended to exaggerate the influence of
the Right, with whom he found common language, and this tended
to warp his judgment. He had not believed that Stalin would
win, and this had also been the belief of many of Roen's
Menshevik friends, who had cooperated with the Bolsheviks in
the hope that the latter would modify their policies as time
went on.
[1929: Russia has standard of
1914 - the contribution of the Menshevik]
By now Russia had risen from the depths of economic disaster
and recovered its position prior to World War I. The Menshevik
and other socialist opponents of the Communist party who had
remained in Russia and had cooperated with the regime had
played a significant role in this achievement.
[First 5 years plan: Nobody
knows who Russia comes out]
Now, however, the five-year plan, decried as unrealistic and
adventurous, had actually been inaugurated, and Rosen (p.69)
was extremely apprehensive about the outcome, both for Russia
and for Russian Jewry.
[24 Jan 1930: Rosen's report
about Russia: Liquidation of the NEP and harsh Communist
policy - new enemy of the people (lishentsy) definitions]
On January 24, 1930, Rosen cabled that general conditions in
Russia had become very difficult. The Stalin group was in
complete control and had adopted a decidedly left-wing policy,
whose main features were the complete liquidation of the NEP -
amounting to a complete eradication of all private business by
means of excessive taxation, confiscation of property,
arrests, and exile. The plan would put a strain on investments
in government industries, with results that were still to be
proven; there would be an ostensibly voluntary, but in reality
forcible, collectivization of millions of poor and
middle-class peasants, combined with ruthless extermination of
the "richer" kulaks.
This, said Rosen, would affect Jews comparatively little, as
there were practically no kulaks among the settlers and very
few among the old colonists. Under the new policy a great
number of people had been deprived of voting rights and were
now classed as
lishentsy;
as such, they received no bread cards and were being expelled
from the cooperatives. While the government had at least a 50
% chance of succeeding in the collectivization drive, there
was real danger of serious peasant disturbances and perhaps
even civil war. Rosen reported discussing these matters with
"our colleagues and Jewish leaders" (sic!) in Russia. His
conclusion was that the Agro-Joint's work must continue,
because its very presence in Russia was extremely important.
[5 June 1930: Rosen's
interventions: Voting rights and no legal restrictions for
former petty traders - Jewish peasants in cooperatives, but
no work in government factories - emigration for Jewish
lishentsy]
Rosen had achieved practical results with his interventions
with government and party officials. One was the restoration
of the voting rights of former petty traders and artisans who
had employed one workman. This would affect at least 50 % of
the Jewish
lishentsy,
automatically eliminating all legal restrictions for them.
Other Jewish groups of lishentsy would be accepted for land
settlement practically without restriction and would be
admitted into cooperatives with various degrees of limitation;
however, neither they nor their children would be accepted in
government factories. Moreover, emigration would be made
easier for
lishentsy
who could secure visas and prepaid tickets from abroad.
(End note 14: AJ 4).
Here, Rosen scored a major victory over his leftist opponents
(p.70)
among the Jewish Communists. On June 5, 1930, the government
did actually publish a decree that in effect restored to about
half of the Jewish
lishentsy
their basic civil rights. The presence of the Agro-Joint
seemed justified even if only on the general grounds of acting
as a defensive shield for the Jewish masses.
[24 Nov 1929: Smolar reports
about four arrested Jews on Crimea]
The situation looked very grim nevertheless. Boris Smolar, the
Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) journalist who happened to be
in Russia at that time, cabled on November 24, 1929, that
"notwithstanding their loyalty", four of the Jewish colonists
in the Crimea
were nevertheless arrested and
sentenced to three years' jail each [and] their property
confiscated, leaving only the property mortgaged by the
Agro-Joint which according to law cannot be confiscated.
...The local population assured me (that) even government
officials are aware that (the) arrested submitted all (the
surplus grain) they could. However, arrest was made with
(the) purpose of showing neighboring non-Jewish peasants
that also Jews are arrested.
[13 Feb 1930: Rosen assures
Jewish loyalty to the Communist regime - German colonists
are disfranchised]
There was no thought of opposing the government's policy.
Rosen pointed out that
with reference to the collectivization policy, we will be
obliged to fall in line. It would be impossible and
inadvisable to carry on Jewish colonization work under a
different system from the general government policy.
The fate of the German colonists who were turned back from
the borders after unsuccessful attempts to get out of the
country and who were permitted to continue their farming
methods without collectivization can teach us a good lesson.
Their position now is much worse than before. They are being
ostracized, are considered enemies of the government and of
the country, and do not receive any assistance from the
government or any credits from the government agricultural
banks, etc.
(End note 15: AJ 2, 2/13/30 [13 February 1930], p.3)
[Agro-Joint: Resistance
against further engagement in Stalin's Communist Russia -
not in Kherson district]
On the contrary - extremist elements, who wanted to end all
foreign participation in the colonization work, managed to
more or less force the Agro-Joint out of the Kherson district
in the Ukraine, where a number of its colonies were situated.
[24 Nov 1929: Kherson
district: Smolar reports that state agronomists are
eliminating the Agro-Joint - the Agro-Joint only can bring
the Jewish lishentsy to the collective]
Smolar reported that "in the Kherson region, which is now 100
(p.71)
percent collectivized, the Agro-Joint now limits itself to
finishing its buildings ... while agricultural supervision
there is done by (a) state agronomist who eliminates (the)
Agro-Joint. This resulted in Agro-Joint closing its central
office in Kherson."
Smolar's contention was that "it remained to the Agro-Joint to
either reorganize its methods to follow the collectivization
line being dominated by the state or limit itself exclusively
to bringing new déclassés from (the) shtetlach on the soil,
settling them on collective principles, and leaving them to
the government, since the collectives are supposed to be
provided for by the government."
(End note 16: AJ 2, 11/24/29 [24 November 1929])
[And the shtetlach are destroyed].
[12 Nov 1931: Rosen's report
that collectivization has driven out many Jews from Jewish
colonies]
Despite the fact that practically no expulsion of kulaks had
taken place in Agro-Joint colonies, the effects of forceful
grain collection and collectivization were similar to those in
other villages. Rosen's statement on November 12, 1931,
admitted that the collectivization "had driven out a good many
people from the colonies",
(End note 17: AJ 2, 11/12/31 [12 November 1931] (press
conference)
although this had been denied by him (and as a result by JDC
in New York) at the time the collectivization actually took
place.
[Since 2 March 1930: Jewish
colonies are stable]
Some basic differences, however, appeared immediately after
Stalin's famous article (March 2, 1930). Basically, as we have
seen, the Jewish colonies had been in the habit of practicing
cooperative principles. They had done this before the
collectivization drive, though the original aim undoubtedly
was the establishment of small private farms. After the
collectivization drive many of the Jewish collectives remained
in existence, and the Jewish farmers hesitated to leave them.
We have no record of the decisions and arguments that must
have taken place on this question in the colonies, but most
probably the arguments were of a pragmatic nature. The
colonies had at least as great a chance as kolkhozy as they
had had when they were private villages.
[Since 2 March 1930: Stalin's
regulations for some private possession for the peasants]
The new post-March regulations permitted the individual
peasant
-- to retain not only his house, but
-- a cow,
-- a small garden and
-- vegetable plot, and
-- a few livestock as well.
[Since 2 March 1930: Stalin's
measures for collectives with big machinery]
The full utilization of Agro-Joint tractors and other modern
machinery was conditional upon the existence of a large
farming area and a rational division of work. On top of that,
the government, despite its temporary tactical withdrawal,
wanted (p.72)
the collectives to succeed; it gave fiscal concessions and
provided cheap seed and other advantages.
[Since 2 March 1930: Jewish
farmers remain more or less collectivized]
Generally, the Jewish farmer was not as intimately bound up
with his property as his non-Jewish neighbor was. In short,
the Jewish colonies by and large remained collectivized.
Rosen cabled on May 27, 1930, that the general situation was
much improved, compared to the January-March period. While a
deficiency of commodities, especially of foodstuffs, was felt
keenly, three factors helped improve the situation: the
partial abandonment of left-wing policies, the generally good
crop outlook for 1930, and a marked progress in industrial
development, resulting in the almost complete disappearance of
unemployment for even slightly skilled labor.
Rosen claimed to have definite information that the left wing
of the party was preparing a new attack at the coming
Communist party conference. This might cause new troubles, but
the chances were that the right wing would triumph. Therefore,
he felt, Agro-Joint could safely go ahead with its projects.
Moreover, Rosen was trying to get Smidovich to oust and to
punish the government officials who had shown excessive zeal
during the collectivization drive and had caused havoc,
especially in the Kherson area.
[18 August 1938: Report from
Chicago Daily Tribune about destruction of Jewish colonies
in SU is wrong]
The Chicago Daily Tribune, which on August 18, 1938, had
declared that the colonies had been "destroyed by the Soviet
government, which had decreed that all individual Jewish
farmers must be united in communal agricultural
establishments", was therefore quite off the mark.
[13 Feb 1930: Rosen is
skeptical to the kolkhozy and is predicting government
change or civil war]
Rosen himself tended to be skeptical regarding the chances of
the kolkhozy while the fierce drive for collectivization was
carried on in Russia. It also seems that he was not quite
aware of the tremendous force of the government and the
bureaucracy that supported the drive. His view, expressed on
February 13, 1930, was that "if it does succeed, everything
will be fine. On the other hand, if it doesn't, and there are
more chances that it won't, there will be two results. They
will have to retreat, and the right wing will come into power
and change the policy; or it might result in a civil war."
(p.73)
(End note 18: AJ 64)
[Since 2 March 1930: Rosen
becomes optimistic for kolkhozy - work with Lubarsky for
decollectivization]
His view changed after the March article by Stalin, which put
an end to the forcible collectivization. This apparently
caused him to agree to Lubarsky's going out to the Ukraine to
help decollectivize the colonies.
[12 April 1930: Attack from
anti-Communist Merezhin against Rosen - and some Jewish
farmers don't want to leave the kolkhozy]
There he met not only with determined Communist opposition -
on April 12, 1930, Merezhin, vice-president of COMZET,
attacked him personally in an article in the Jewish Communist
paper
Emes - but
also, as we have seen, with a reluctance on the part of some
of the Jewish farmers to leave the kolkhozy.
[April 1930: Exodus from the
kolkhozy]
Others of course, joined in the general exodus from the
collectives.
[9 April 1930: Smolar reports
that Jewish colonists take cows and horses away from the
collectives]
Smolar reported on April 9, 1930, that in the Krivoi Rog
region Jewish colonists forcibly took away from the
collectives not only their cows but also horses, which was
illegal.
(End note 19: AJ 5)
[31 May 1930: Cable of Smolar
about fire in Jewish colony Ingulets because of kolkhoz
quarrel]
His cable of May 31, 1930, on the other hand, related the sad
story of the Jewish colony of Ingulets near Krivoi Rog, where
Ukrainian peasants burned down the Jewish colony because the
Jews had not abandoned their kolkhoz.
(End note 20: Ibid. [AJ 5])
[Rosen with feelings between
efficiency and the bad methods of collectivization]
Rosen himself appears to have been torn between two opposing
emotions. One was that "the idea of collectivization in the
production of grain is a perfectly sound one,"
(End note 21: AJ 64, 2/13/30 [13 February 1930])
and the other was abhorrence at the method by which this aim
had been achieved. Rosen was, after all, a socialist. His
sympathy with many aspects of the Soviet regime was real, and
the cooperative or collective principles in agriculture were
very dear to his heart. In this he was by no means unique.
[Mirkin supports
collectivization totally - only an advantage]
Mirkin of ICA, in the report already quoted, went so far as to
say: "I must say that all our agronomists and our officials
... are unanimous in recognizing that collectivization has had
only favorable results for our activity and for the colonists
themselves."
(End note 22: AJ 160, Mirkin memorandum, 2/12/30 [12 February
1930])
[Since May 1930 appr.:
Ukraine: Ukrainian
farmers are driven back to the collectives by economic pressure]
The Ukrainian peasants took their time in rejoining the
collectives they had precipitately left after March 1930. But
slowly they were forced back by economic pressures:
-- they were taxed much harder as individual peasants than as
collective farmers,
-- they had few draft animals and livestock left,
-- and they simply could not maintain themselves outside the
collectives.
[Since May 1930 appr.: Ukraine: Jewish farmers can
exist]
The Jewish colonies prospered by comparison.
-- Their livestock had been damaged to a (p.74)
much lesser degree,
-- their method of working of land did not materially change,
-- and they - especially the Agro-Joint colonies - came out of
the collectivization drive relatively well.
[Jan 1930: Fund raising of
AMSOJEFS - skeptical "US" voices because of collectivization
- appeal to invest in Palestine by Zionist newspaper
"Reflex"]
Against this background, AMSOJEFS started to apply the money
subscribed to it by some of the richer Jewish elements in the
United States. Here again the work started with some
misgiving. The collectivization drive cast a shadow over the
scene. Attacks by Zionists and from rightist elements
abounded. "The colonization plan has not only not solved the
economic problem of Russian Jewry", wrote the right-wing
Zionist [newspaper]
Reflex
in January 1930, "but has not had the slightest effect on its
economic situation. ... The Jewish villager is not better off
economically than the city dweller. They are both starving,
they are both in despair, economically, physically, and
socially, and they are both a prey to the Bolshevik hounds."
Had the JDC's "fifteen or twenty million dollars been invested
in Jewish colonization in Palestine, the Jewish position there
would have been impregnable, and the Arab, instead of
attacking the Jew, would have eaten out of his hand and would
have considered him a savior. Woe to a people whose policies
are controlled by men whose only wisdom is a big money bag."
[Russia: Jewish Agro-Joint
settlements installed - Germans and Tartars on Crimea have
to give way to Jews]
Investment for the establishment of colonies was not
interrupted. According to one set of JDC figures,
-- in 1929, 2,276 families were settled;
-- in 1930, 2,250;
-- by the end of 1930, it was said that some 12,100 families
had been settled by the Agro-Joint on its colonies in the
Ukraine and in the Crimea.
It was claimed that 289 colonies had been founded. A Jewish
autonomous region was established near Krivoi Rog around the
center of Kalinindorf.
German and Tartar settlers in the Crimea had been moved
"voluntarily" to allow for close Jewish settlement, and
[Rosen foresees there is no
stability in Russia's society and all work can be destroyed
soon]
the situation should have satisfied the Agro-Joint. It did,
too - at least in New York. But Rosen was too much of a
realist not to grasp the meaning of the swift changes in
Russian society that were bound to affect his entire effort.
