[4.3. Germany
blocks in the League of Nations - foundation of a High
Commission for Jewish refugees]
[29 Sep 1933: Session of
League of Nations whith proposals for Jewish refugees -
Germans blocking - resolution for a commission outside
of the League of Nations]
On September 29 [1933], during the seventy-third League of
Nations session in Geneva, the Dutch foreign minister, de
Graaf, made a plea to the second committee of the League
Assembly to help German refugees. Money, he thought, would
probably come from Jewish organizations, but organized
international help was essential. At that stage, however,
Germany was still a League of Nations member and
threatened to vote against any proposal to set up a League
commission for refugees from Germany. Unanimity was a
condition for League decisions, and therefore the Germans
were able to block action effectively. Several of the
smaller nations proposed that a commission be set up that
would technically be outside the League machinery. On
October 11 [1933] a resolution to this effect was passed
by the League.
[Coordination with the
"USA" for an international commission]
It was obvious from the start that any international
commission of this kind would have to include
representatives of the United States if it was to be at
all effective. As a matter of fact, the Dutch had
approached the American representative in Switzerland on
September 28, the day before their abortive effort in the
League, and asked his help in setting up a commission.
(End note 7: Foreign Relations of the United States
(1933), 3.366)
The American Jewish organizations were very much
interested in such a commission, which would lend
international support to refugee aid. They (p.141)
were also aware that the success of such a commission
might well hinge on the personality who would head it. For
that reason, on October 18 Henry Morgenthau, Sr., wrote to
Secretary of State Cordell Hull suggesting that James G.
McDonald, a respected member of the New York Times staff
and president of the Foreign Policy Association since
1918, be nominated. Significantly, he added that this
proposal had the support of both the American Jewish
Committee and JDC.
(End note 8: WYC, Box 303 (b), Morgenthau to Hull,
10/18/33 [18 October 1933])
[McDonald nominated for
high commissioner for refugees (Jewish and other) coming
from Germany]
Support by the two closely allied agencies was not
surprising at all. The Times was owned by Jewish liberals
of the old school, and McDonald, a devout Christian and
humanist, had gained the respect of Jew and gentile alike.
On top of that, he was a personal friend of Felix M.
Warburg's, and Warburg had apparently supported his
candidacy with Morgenthau. In his letter to Roosevelt on
October 19 [1933], Hull said that he thought an American
might indeed be suggested for the post, but he himself was
by no means enthusiastic about American involvement in
this essentially European affair. In case the president
thought differently, Hull suggested a number of prominent
Americans who might be considered for the post; McDonald's
name was not among them - apparently, Morgenthau's letter
had either not reached Hull or had been ignored. However,
Roosevelt did indeed think differently, and McDonald was
nominated for the post of "
high commissioner for refugees (Jewish and other)
coming from Germany", and on October 26 was
appointed by the League of Nations.
[Structures of the "High
Commission"]
Twelve member states composed the governing body of the
High Commission, chaired by Viscount Cecil of Chetwood.
The United States was represented by Prof. Joseph P.
Chamberlain of Columbia University, and expert on refugee
matters. An advisory council of voluntary organizations
was to include 20 bodies, ten of them Jewish.
[Misuse of the Jewish
organizations: They should solve all problems alone -
naive JDC leadership]
Immediately after this commission was set up it became
clear that at least some of the governments saw its
existence as a convenient way of shelving the whole
problem and handing it over to the Jewish organizations to
deal with as best they could. Here, as in (p.142)
so many other instances throughout the 1930s, JDC central
leadership proved that its understanding of international
politics as they applied to the Jewish refugee problems
was characterized by a naivité that was sometimes quite
unbelievable.
