[C.] Evian
[conference summer 1938]
[6.7. Evian Conference in July 1938 -
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR) set up]
[Many countries don't
want the Jewish problem - farmers for South America
possible - other countries follow the "USA" and do not
rise their quotas]
At the conference itself, held at Evian, France, between
July 6 and July 15, 1938, two main ideas seem to have been
in the minds of Taylor and George L. Warren, his executive
secretary and chief aide:
-- to try to get countries of immigration to make liberal
immigration declarations,
-- and to establish international machinery (directed
mainly by the U.S.) that would enter into negotiations
with Germany.
There were difficulties on both points, however. The
statements of the various representatives were
discouraging and often tinged with anti-Semitism.
For example, the Australian representative declared that
"as we have no real racial problem we are not desirous of
importing one". Latin American delegates were very
restrained - a few countries, like Brazil, Argentina,
Colombia, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Peru, offered some
prospect for the immigration of agricultural workers or
farmers. All made a special point of declaring that no
merchants or intellectuals would be allowed in.
Nowhere was special legislation to allow immigration being
contemplated, and of course in this matter the U.S.
example was being followed.
[GB and Commonwealth
states: Palestine closed - possible emigration to East
Africa possible]
Britain's representative, Lord Winterton, declared that
Palestine was temporarily closed to large-scale
immigration until a political solution was found. However,
he declared, there were prospects for settling refugees in
Kenya and other parts of East Africa.
(End note 30:
The official protocols of the Evian Conference are kept in
9-28. Winterton said, 7/15/38 [15 July 1938], on
Palestine:
"Il est apparu indispensable, non pas sans doute
l'interrompre l'immigration juive - ce qui n'a jamais été
envisagé - mais de l'assujettir à certaines restrictions
d'un caractère purement temporaire et exceptionnel, ayant
pour but de maintenir, dans les limites raisonnables, la
population dans les rapports numériques actuel, en
attendant une décision définitive ... relativement à
l'avenir politique du pays" -
[Translation: "It seems to be indispensable, no, without
any doubt to interrupt the Jewish immigration - what never
had been in project - but to subject to certain
restrictions of an absolute temporary and exceptional
character, for a definitive decision ... relatively for
the political future of the country"]
a clear foreshadowing of the British move away from the
partition proposal of 1937 toward the 1939 White Paper on
Palestine. See
-- Morse, op. cit. [Morse, Arthur D.: While Six Million
Died; New York 1968], pp. 212-13;
-- Wyman, op. cit. [Wyman, David S.: Paper Walls; Amherst,
Mass., 1968], pp. 49-50, and
-- Mashberg, op. cit. [Mashberg, Michael: America and the
Refugee Crisis; M.A. thesis; City University of New York,
1970])
This declaration was "an unexpected and welcome gesture."
(End note 31: 9-27, Brotman to Laski, no date [July
1938?])
Britain (p.233)
itself, Winterton said, was not a country of immigration.
Yet the people of the United Kingdom were ready to play
their part within the narrow limits feasible, given the
high degree of industrialization and the large number of
unemployed in Britain.
[European representatives
state the Jews have to go overseas - little countries
only want to be temporary havens]
European countries emphasized the necessity for emigration
overseas, but Holland and Denmark stressed their
relatively liberal policies as transit countries. Speaking
for Switzerland, which had refused to play host to the
conference, the police chief, Dr. Rothmund, insisted that
his country could only be a temporary stopover en route to
other places.
(End note 32: See note 30 above and: Ludwig, op. cit.
[Ludwig, Carl: Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Schweiz seit
1933 bis zur Gegenwart. Bericht an den Bundesrat [The
refugee policy of Switzerland since 1933 to the present];
Zurich, no date [1957], p. 84, footnote 1)
["US" delegate Taylor
states that the machinery of emigration has to begin]
Taylor himself had no illusions regarding the prospect of
getting public governmental declarations welcoming
refugees. Although insisting in his opening speech that
governments must act promptly on the refugee question, he
also said that probably no more "could be expected than
that the conference should put into motion the
machinery and
correlate it with existing machinery that will, in the
long run, contribute to a practical amelioration of the
condition."
(End note 33: 9-28, and Wyman, op. cit. [Wyman, David S.:
Paper Walls; Amherst, Mass., 1968], pp. 49-50)
[Jewish Refugees with
special education are accepted in some countries -
prepare the refugees]
The declarations, while far from satisfactory, were not
quite as negative as press criticism at the time and
historical accounts since then would have us believe.
While we have seen that some countries of potential refuge
refused to consider immigration, others were willing to
accept people under certain conditions. It was therefore a
matter of providing refugees with sufficient means to make
their immigration to those countries attractive to the
governments concerned.
(End note 34: 9-28, Brotman memo, 7/16/38 [16 July 1938];
According to Brotman, who represented the British Board of
Deputies, representatives of governments were apt to be
more liberal privately than in public speeches).
This was by no means easy to achieve.
[GB and France want the
Jewish refugee discussion only in the League of Nations]
Britain and France were reluctant to have the refugee
question taken out of the League of Nations, where their
influence was paramount.
[Malcolm appeals for
government funds for emigration - large emigration does
not seem to be possible]
Sir Neil Malcolm, the League of Nations high commissioner
for refugees, displeased the Americans by stating that
government funds were needed and that private
organizations could not possibly bear the burden. He also
spoke his mind regarding the attitude of the governments
and declared that "large-scale immigration and settlement
... presently appear impossible."
(End note 35: New York Times, 7/9/38 [9 July 1938])
Warren termed his speech "not helpful".
(End note 36: CON-2, Warren to Chamberlain, 7/9/38 [9 July
1938])
[Plan for an
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR)]
In the end, however, the British and French agreed to the
setting up of an Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
(ICR), which (p.234)
would be located in London; presumably ICR would swallow
up the League committee under Malcolm.
[Polish and Romanian
Jewish problems are not discussed at Evian conference!]
These were not the only problems raised at Evian. Poland
and Romania tried to have the conference deal with the
emigration of their Jewish populations, but the
delegations from Britain and France very energetically
rejected all such attempts. The discussions were limited
to the subject of persons - termed "involuntary emigrants"
- who might be forced out of Germany and Austria in the
future and those who had already left but had found no
satisfactory place of permanent residence (their number
was estimated at 30,000).
Only in the long run was it proposed to deal with larger
aspects of the question, thus including the emigration
problem of East European Jewry.
[So, all European Yiddish Jews are excluded from
discussion...]
The delegations of German and Austrian Jews, prodded by
the Gestapo to make clear to the conferees the necessity
of finding havens quickly, made a considerable impression.
(End note 37: For a fictionalized but essentially true
account, see: Hans Habe: The Mission; New York 1966)
[Speeches from the Jewish
organizations of the "free countries" - chaos and no
collaboration]
The Jewish organizations from the free countries, about 21
of them, presented a spectacle of disunity and confusion.
The Liaison Committee, under Norman Bentwich, drew up a
statement, but the individual groups would not forgo their
right to make separate appearances; as a result a large
number of speeches were made, more or less repeating each
other.
(End note 38: See note 31 above [End note 31: 9-27,
Brotman to Laski, no date [July 1938?]; Brotman added that
Winterton's secretary was "doing her best to tell Lord
Winterton that all Jews are not like those at the
conference." The remark reveals the Briton's anti-Semitic
instincts and the British Jew's feeling of inferiority
rather than the failings of the Jewish organizations).
Jonah B. Wise represented JDC at Evian, and his
presentation on July 14 was really a summary of what JDC
had achieved up to that time. He emphasized that JDC's
resources were limited and based on voluntary
contributions, and that it was necessary that the
emigrants be able to take out some of their own capital.
["USA" and JDC want to
press GB to reopen Palestine for Jewish mass
immigration]
In official American eyes the role of JDC was quite
important. Prior to Evian, JDC leaders had been invited to
an informal meeting with Warren, Prof. Joseph P.
Chamberlain, and James G. McDonald, where stress was laid
on the pressure that would be brought to bear on Britain
to get her to open her possessions to refugee settlement.
The point was made that if the British hold back, "they
may hurt their present relationship with our government".
(End note 39: 9-27, informal meeting, 6/3/38 [3 June
1938])
[Arabs and Palestinians are not asked...]
[WJC Goldmann is
plain-talking]
It must be stressed that only the World Jewish Congress,
represented (p.235)
by Dr. Nahum Goldman, disregarded the appeals for
moderation.
-- It [WJC] sharply attacked German practices,
-- demanded that the Jewish problem be viewed as a whole,
-- said that Jews fleeing from Eastern Europe should also
be helped,
-- and insisted that uncultivated areas be set aside for
Jewish settlement.
-- Also, WJC thought that government financing was
indispensable because private agencies would not be able
to support the emigration by themselves.
[The Evian results: In
fact no big result - ICR is set up under director
Rublee]
JDC was not displeased with the outcome of Evian. In a
telephone conversation with Baerwald on July 14, McDonald
declared that he was "satisfied they accomplished
everything that could be expected under the
circumstances."
(End note 40: Ibid. [9-27, informal meeting], McDonald to
Baerwald (telephone), 7/14/38 [14 July 1938])
Baerwald agreed. It must be remembered that JDC was privy
to Taylor's intentions at the conference to have the U.S.
set up ICR, whose task it should be, as Taylor constantly
reiterated, to negotiate with the Germans. JDC was
sympathetic to this line of thought. Its Paris secretary,
Nathan Katz, was asked to prepare for and take part in the
discussions at the first ICR meeting in London on August
3, 1938. Taylor's statement on that occasion had been
prepared "in Paris with the cooperation of Dr. Kahn and
myself", as Katz wrote.
(End note 41: Ibid. [9-27, informal meeting], Katz to
Baerwald, 8/9/38 [9 August 1938])
Typically, the number of people who would have to be dealt
with by ICR in Germany was put at 660,000; this included
all persecuted "non-Aryans" and other gentiles, so that
the Jewish aspect could be toned down as much as possible.
[and this probably included Austria, because Austria had
become Germany. But there is no indication].
A small administrative budget, to be paid to ICR by the
governments, was agreed to after some haggling, and George
Rublee, an American lawyer, was elected director - in
fact, prospective negotiator with Germany. An assistant
director, Robert Pell, was loaned from the State
Department, indicating that these proceedings were
considered to be of some importance for American
diplomacy.
(End note 42:
-- Morse, op. cit. [Morse, Arthur D.: While Six Million
Died; New York 1968], pp. 218-19;
-- Wyman, op. cit. [Wyman, David S.: Paper Walls; Amherst,
Mass., 1968], pp. 51-52)
JDC leadership tended to regard the very fact of American
and international involvement in the refugee problem as a
great step forward. Kahn wrote about "the message of the
Evian Conference, the significance of a great gathering
which solemnly affirmed the initial responsibility of
humanity in the solution of the problems of the refugees."
(p.236)
(End note 43: Executive Committee, Kahn to Budget and
Scope Committee, 9/18/38 [18 September 1938])
As a result of the Evian Conference most governments
adopted a "wait and see" attitude. The immediate results
of the conference amounted to nothing. (p.239)
