[2.6. Agro-Joint activities going down by
industrialization since 1930 - schools]
[1933: Jewish farmer
settlements not attractive any more]
The growth of industry, on one hand, and the repeated
disasters of Soviet agriculture, on the other, made
agricultural settlement considerably less attractive to
Russian Jews. Settlement was much lower in 1933; after 1934 no
more claims are made of families settling on land in the
Crimea, the Ukraine, or White Russia. JDC claimed that
altogether 14,036 families had been settled in its (p.83)
colonies by 1934. There are some doubts as to the accuracy of
the figure, but it can serve as a general indication of the
extent of the colonization effort.
[Agro-Joint trade schools and
training courses]
One other aspect of JDC work in Russia was of great importance
in the history of Russian Jewry: the development of trade
schools and training courses. There were several of these.
[Agro-Joint's trade schools -
Odessa: Children's home becomes trade school - Agro-Joint
schools become part of the Russian industrialization]
But the most interesting one was Evrabmol in Odessa. this had
started as an orphans' home after World War I, under the
directorship of P.M. Kaganovsky. It acquired land on the
outskirts of Odessa and established a training farm. Later the
home moved back into the city and became a technical school.
The children, some of whom did not even know the names of
their parents, were saved from life in the streets and the
catacombs of Odessa and became useful citizens.
Beginning in the early 1920s Evrabmol was supported by JDC and
became an eminently successful school; in l1929/30 it began to
pay its own way by selling the products of its shops. It then
became attached to the Commissariat (Ministry) of Heavy
Industry and, with the benevolent help of the Odessa town
soviet (municipality), continued to develop to the
satisfaction of everyone concerned.
Evrabmol, two other institutions in Odessa, and schools and
courses at Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolaev, and other places had some
8,580 students in 1930. These schools and courses, originally
under the Commissariat of Education, were transferred to the
industrial commissariats in the course of the five-year plan.
This meant that the Agro-Joint was playing a certain part in
the absorption of Jewish youths into the swiftly growing
industry, despite its failure to establish the
industrialization program with significant American financial
help. The attempt was made to direct the student toward heavy
industry, mainly the metal industry, in such new trades as
that of automobile mechanic. These were high-priority areas in
Soviet industrialization, and had the Jews stuck to their
traditional trades, their chances of partaking in the
tremendous revolution that was going on would have diminished
considerably.
Another factor has to be considered. In 1931 the Soviet
government began a series of economic negotiations with
Western governments. (p.84)
[Foreign technicians at the
schools give motivation for pupils]
At the same time, foreign technicians came in in rather
significant numbers, and the attitude toward technicians and
experts generally was little short of adulation in Russia.
Wage differentials between these experts and ordinary citizens
grew swiftly, and Jewish trainees were encouraged to dream of
becoming members of this favored class. The efforts of
Agro-Joint to establish, maintain, and equip trade schools,
apart from or in cooperation with the ORT schools, must be
seen against that general background. Government encouragement
and interest in these schools was very obvious, and, as
industrialization proceeded, so did the hunger of Soviet
industry for skilled workers. By the time the government took
these schools over from the Agro-Joint in 1935, there were 42
of them, some operating at a very high level of training.
[Odessa: Vinchevsky Technical
School - training in Kremenchug]
Two of these schools should be mentioned here. One was the
Vinchevsky Technical School in Odessa, and the other was a
special training course instituted in the town of Kremenchug.
The Vinchevsky School was actually the continuation of one of
the Jewish trade schools that had been set up during the
czarist regime. The Soviets had taken over this school, and
the Agro-Joint developed it into one of the most important
technical schools in the Ukraine.
(End note 32: AJ 2, Rosen's letter, March 1936)
[Agro-Joint shops for Jewish
lishentsy to get out of the banned status]
Also, in their shops the mutual aid societies trained artisans
who were thus enabled to escape their
lishentsy status and
eventually to enter government factories. An interesting
example of this is provided by the development in Georgia, in
the Caucasus. There, Georgian Jews formed a mutual aid society
in 1929, with an initial capital of 16 rubles (officially, $
8). The Agro-Joint stepped in, and with its help 82 artels
were organized by 1931, employing 2,568 persons, of whom 2,053
were Jews. The chief trades were knitting and needlework,
reflecting the occupational structure of Georgian - but not
just Georgian - Jewry.
(End note 33: AJ 20)
[Agro-Joint schools are
factor for job changing and integration of Jews into Soviet
industry]
In the course of its industrial activity, Agro-Joint made a
conscious effort to direct Jews away from their traditional
occupations. The production of lathes and other machinery at
Evrabmol, the production of dental burrs at Kiev - these
efforts were made with (p.85)
a clearly formulated aim of helping to change the occupational
structure of Russian Jewry. Ultimately, however, the relative
success of this occupational change depended on whether the
Jews could be "fitted into the general structure of the
economic and social life of the country."
(End note 34: AJ 2, Rosen's letter, March 1936)
This the government did, and it was the economic revolution of
the five-year plan rather than any Jewish effort that enabled
the Jews to be absorbed in the newly created industrial
structure.
The Agro-Joint helped in this process, eased the transition,
and spared many Jews a great deal of privation. But it must be
recognized that it was not because of any accomplishment by
the Agro-Joint that some 350,000 Jews became factory workers
in the course of the first five-year plan. This fact was fully
recognized by Rosen, and he was to draw certain conclusions
from it.
[1934: Industrialization is
fixed - Agro-Joint is less needed]
By 1934 Agro-Joint industrial work was completed. Soviet
industry had become a giant, still rather unsteady on its huge
feet, but a giant all the same. The help of a foreign
organization dealing specifically with transitional problems
could be dispensed with. The 644 shops of the aid societies
were still employing 8,278 workers, and this included the 66
aided by Agro-Joint. These were taken over by the government
in 1934.
At the same time, in October 1934, the Ukrainian Red Cross
absorbed the medical societies under an agreement that insured
equal treatment to the lishentsy. By that time the whole
lishentsy problem had been solved, to all intents and
purposes. Only some religious and older people (less than 5 %
of the Jewish population) were still affected, and there was
no longer any justification for maintaining a large
administration and special institutions for these unfortunate
people. Members of their families could supply them with the
bare necessities of life, and though their position was far
from pleasant, JDC's help no longer seemed necessary.
[1932: Agro-Joint's funds
melt down by depression in the "USA" - death of Rosenwald on
6 Jan 1932]
In the meantime, as a result of the economic disaster that had
struck America, subscribers found it harder and harder to
honor their subscriptions. By 1932 the situation had become
critical. It must be remembered that JDC's collections went
down to a low of $ 385,000 in 1932, and budgets were cut most
cruelly at a time (p.86)
when the need was overwhelming. Only the agricultural work in
Russia, secured as it was by individual contractual
subscriptions, continued. The society supplied its $ 1 million
yearly and thus enabled Rosen to continue his work. This
unique situation could not continue, and in 1932 AMSOJEFS
found that it would have to cease payments.
[At the same time Stalin is laughing at capitalism in it's
depression of bourse speculation].
The direct cause for this disaster was the death, on January
6, 1932, of Julius Rosenwald, whose wealth had been invested
largely in stocks. The probate of his will was a very
complicated affair, and the claims of tax collectors and
creditors had to be settled before payments of AMSOJEFS could
be expected. In fact, there was the real danger that with the
devaluation of stocks, the estate would have difficulties in
satisfying the demands of both creditors and tax people.
Payments on the subscriptions to AMSOJEFS were out of the
question. In this situation the leaders of JDC entrusted to
Rosen the delicate task of negotiating with the Soviet
government a new agreement, which would prelude the actual
cash payment of any more money by American subscribers.
Rosen's trump card was the amount of ruble assets JDC had
accumulated in Russia and which JDC had at least a theoretical
right to take out in dollars.
[1930-1932: Stalin's regime
does not need foreign organizations any more - restrictions]
But by 1932 the Russians were no longer as eager to negotiate
with a foreign organization as they had been before. Rumblings
against foreign organizations had been heard before, and as
early as December 11, 1929, Grower had declared to JTA that
"some minor people agitate against foreign organizations
without any hope of success in responsible circles."
(End note 35: AJ 4)
These agitations turned out not to be so minor after all, and
Diamanstein, leader of the Yevsektsia, had some very harsh
things to say about the Agro-Joint at an OZET Congress in
1930. "Agro-Joint does not understand Soviet policy and does
not want to understand it." He said that the Soviet people
needed to utilize these organizations, especially as they had
agreements with the Soviet government, but he added that the
government authorities must supervise these organizations to
insure that they were under the proper direction.
(End note 36: AJ 59, JTA [Jewish Telegraphic Agency] report,
December 1930)
This was too much for Rosen. At the beginning of 1931 he wrote
(p.87)
a very strong letter to COMZET about the active campaign
against the Agro-Joint. To his complaint Rosen added a threat:
"The people at the head of our organization have no desire
whatsoever to impose our work on anybody and it is entirely
out of the question for us to be in a position of a
'tolerated' organization."
(End note 37: AJ 11, 1/30/31 [30 January 1931])
The answer, signed by Smidovich, was sent after discussions
with the government, and apparently the extremists were
defeated. "The articles and speeches of private individuals",
the COMZET letter of February 16, 1930, said, "do not in any
way reflect the attitude of the government toward the work of
the Agro-Joint."
While this was a clear repudiation of the position of the
Communist Left, undercurrents in the party against the
Agro-Joint grew stronger. In April 1931 Lubarsky was arrested
and spent a month in prison before Rosen managed to get him
out. In 1932 the Soviets were ready to reduce the Agro-Joint
work in Russia by stages.
(End note 38: AJ 11, AJ 90)
[1932 appr.: JDC claims that
SU regime has not fulfilled the agreement of 1929 - but
there is more SU money in the Agro-Joint colonies than
foreseen]
At first JDC gave some consideration to the idea of
camouflaging their lack of ability to pay by suing the USSR
for not having fulfilled the contract conditions, in
accordance with an arbitration clause in the 1929 agreement.
This clause was based on the principle of
rebus sic stantibus: the
agreement was held to have been violated by the government's
having changed, by its policy of collectivization, the
conditions under which the Agro-Joint conducted the work. Farm
settlements in Russia would have been considerably less
attractive in the eyes of Jewish subscribers in the United
States had they known that their money would in fact go into
the kolkhoz settlements. In the end, however, JDC refrained
from any attempt to sue the Russians. The work was deemed to
have succeeded after all, and the Russian government had
certainly fulfilled the financial conditions; in fact, they
had spent considerably more in rubles on Agro-Joint colonies
than they had been bound by contract to do.
By 1933, $ 4,857,563 was actually paid on the subscriptions,
of which the Rosenwald share amounted to about $ 3 million of
the $ 5 million promised. The sum of $ 4,725,000 had actually
been sent to Russia, and $ 2,475,000 was still to come under
the original (p.88) eight-year agreement (1928 to 1935).
[14 April 1933: New agreement
between JDC and the Soviet regime]
On April 14, 1933, Rosen sighed a new agreement with the
Soviet government. The Soviets had given AMSOJEFS bonds for
the money they had actually received, which they would
ultimately have to redeem. Interest was also to be paid up to
the end of the eight-year contract. They now accepted a part
of these bonds and waived payment of interest in lieu of the
money the society owed them. After that, part of the bonds for
the money they had received from America still remained in the
hands of AMSOJEFS. They now issued bonds for the $ 2,475,000
they had received through the new agreement, and thus left
AMSOJEFS with $ 5,352,000 in Soviet bonds bearing a 5 %
interest.
(End note 39:
The total amount of interest the Soviets would have had to pay
on the $ 4,725,000 until the end of 1935 was $ 627,000. This
they accepted as payment from AMSOJEFS. In addition, AMSOJEFS
handed back to the Soviets Soviet bonds in the amount of $
1,848,000 out of the $ 4,725,000 in bonds that the Soviets had
given AMSOJEFS when they received the money from America.
Together, these two sums came to $ 2,475,000 which AMSOJEFS
owed the Soviet government. For these bonds and waiver of
interest which was worth dollar payment, the Soviets issued
new bonds ($ 2,475,000) which, together with the $ 2,877,000
in bonds that had remained in the hands of AMSOJEFS after the
$ 1,848,000 had been paid, made for a total of $ 5,352,000 in
Soviet bonds, which were partly repaid and partly returned by
agreement by the end of 1940. The 1933 agreement was, of
course, extremely favorable to AMSOJEFS).
at the same time an agreement was reached on the Agro-Joint
assets in Russia. Assets worth 5.6 million rubles were handed
over to the government, and the government in turn gave the
Agro-Joint the equivalent in cash and credits. The Agro-Joint
promised to use the money for intensive plantation programs,
various kinds of training courses, administration, and other
items.
The agreement was profitable to both sides. The Agro-Joint was
relieved of the need to supply more cash, and the Russians
obtained a firm legal hold over the Agro-Joint estates in
their country, improved their financial arrangement with the
society, and at the same time began the process of an orderly
termination of the society's affairs in their country.
[Since 1933: Agro-Joint
activities going down in Russia]
The end had clearly arrived. As we have seen, the
possibilities of agricultural settlement in Russia were
decreasing rapidly. Rosen claimed that in 1933 only 1,400
families were settled in the Crimea, but even this looked
rather doubtful.
(End note 40: AJ 2, 4/14/34 [14 April 1934])
Jews now did not have to go to the Crimea in order to become
small-scale farmers on the outskirts of villages and towns,
but could do so wherever they lived. The Jewish economic
position continued to improve, and the Agro-Joint and its
operations seemed to be more and more superfluous.
[1931: Ukraine: Agro-Joint
liquidated by industrialization]
In 1931 the Ukrainian work was liquidated, the Agro-Joint
having simply been told that they had nothing more to do
there. (p.89)
(End note 41: AJ 11, 4/30/31 [30 April 1931])
[1932-1934: Crimea:
Agro-Joint experts on Jewish settlements]
In 1932-34, work was concentrated in the Crimea. Government
supervision in all respects except the purely agroeconomic one
was complete. Some of the assets of the Agro-Joint were
not, it s true, handed over: for example, the Jankoy tractor
station and repair shop, buildings in Simferopol and Moscow,
supplies, and commodities. Even after the termination of its
actual settlement work in 1934, the Agro-Joint still
maintained a large staff of experts who, with income from the
existing assets and some very small sums in dollars, continued
to advise the settlements about their agricultural production.
The Jankoy station was one of the prototypes of the MTS
tractor stations that were to provide tractor work for the
kolkhozy later on. In other respects too, such as
well-drilling and horticulture, Agro-Joint help was still
significant.
But Rosen's absences from Russia grew longer and longer, and
the work was slowly reduced to a minimum.
[1937: Agro-Joint in Russia
is going down]
In 1937 the Agro-Joint still had 6 million rubles' worth of
assets, but its staff (which at the peak of colonization
numbered some 3,000 employees) had dwindled to about 100.
The fact that the Agro-Joint's presence was becoming
undesirable in 1937/8 was made very evident. This was the time
of the purges, and it was unthinkable that a foreign
organization like the Agro-Joint would be allowed to carry on
much longer. Smidovich died in 1935 and was succeeded by a
Stalinist bureaucrat named Chuchkaieff. The end was near.
