[2.7. The Biro-Bidjan / Birobidzhan project for Jews
from Russia and Poland 1926-1935]
[Since 1926: Biro-Bidjan is
far away from Jewish centers in Russia]
In the mid-thirties a new factor appeared, which seemed to
promise a certain reversal of the trend that was pushing the
Agro-Joint out of Soviet Russia. This was the question of
Biro-Bidjan and the prospects of immigration into Russia.
Back in 1926 the Soviet government had put forward a proposal
to set aside the territory of Biro-Bidjan, on the Amur River
in the Far East, for settlement by the Jews. If enough Jews
settled there, a Soviet Jewish republic would be set up; the
Jewish nation would have the benefit of a territorial basis,
like all the other nationalities in the Soviet Union.
Kalinin, the president of the Soviet Union, was a particularly
ardent proponent of this scheme and expressed his views in a
(p.90)
number of speeches. But acceptance of the scheme by Jewish
Communist circles in Russia was rather equivocal. Some Jewish
Communists thought that this was a reversion to Jewish
nationalism or Zionism. Indeed, that is how the Zionists
themselves saw it: as a belated recognition of the fact that
the Jews were an ex-territorial nation whose national
revolution could only be achieved by the settlement of a land
of their own. Of course they did not accept Biro-Bidjan as the
final goal, but hoped that an early failure of the experiment
would open the way for Soviet recognition of
Palestine-centered Zionism.
JDC was approached about - indeed, pressured into - accepting
the Biro-Bidjan project and working there. Rosen, however, was
wary. The Crimean venture was still in the making, conditions
there were relatively good, and he was disinclined to embark
on a wild project in the middle of nowhere, thousands of miles
from the centers of Jewish life in Russia. Biro-Bidjan
obviously needed investigation, and the fact that the
government wanted to populate areas on its borders with
Japanese-controlled Manchuria and to exploit its natural
resources was no argument in favor of Agro-Joint's
participation.
[Since late 1920s:
Biro-Bidjan / Birobidzhan becomes attractive because of
discriminations in Poland and by NS governments]
This situation changed considerably with the advent of the
Hitler regime and the decided worsening of the economic
conditions for Polish Jewry. Soviet Russia was now playing
with the idea of providing an asylum for victims of Nazi
persecution; Biro-Bidjan could develop into a national home
that was not necessarily restricted to Russian Jews.
In 1931 Rosen reported that he had been officially approached
by COMZET to assist in the immigration of 10,000 Jewish
families, of whom half would go to agriculture, half would
come from Poland, and many would go to Biro-Bidjan.
(End note 42: AJ 66, 10/8/31 [8 Ocotober 1931])
Rosen's reaction was cool. With the pressure mounting, early
in 1932 Kahn defined his attitude to the question in a letter
to Max M. Warburg in Hamburg.
(End note 43: AJ 173, 2/14/32 [14 February 1932])
Stating that Biro-Bidjan was one of the so-called
territorialist projects (envisaging the concentration of Jews
in a territory or territories outside of Palestine), he said
that (p.91)
these so-called
territorialists are now becoming stronger everywhere in the
world, and especially this movement is winning support among
the youth, since one can see for himself that Palestine is
not in a position to relieve the needs among the Jews and
that a mass immigration to Palestine is not possible.
Utilizing this psychological situation, the highest Russian
officialdom have now in their sessions for some time
determined to make available in Biro-Bidjan a territory in
which a Jewish national entity could develop.
But, added Kahn,
at the present time for the
Jews of Russia the better possibility for support lies in
industry and in the factories, so that the Russians have
proceeded to enlist foreign Jews for Biro-Bidjan. A number
of Jews from the Argentine have already emigrated there, as
have also 20 young people from Germany and 200 from
Lithuania and Latvia. In view of increasing
unemployment, it is believed that perhaps even unemployed
from America and Palestine will settle in Biro-Bidjan. At
this time there are about 5,500 Jewish persons which is
approximately double the amount of a year ago. This year
12,000 new immigrants are to be sent there, and in the year
1933 they plan to settle 20,000 there. ... I personally do
not believe in the success of this settlement. What has been
achieved there up to now does not justify great hopes.
This was probably an expression of Rosen's vies also.
There the matter rested till about the middle of 1934.
However, with the refugee problem growing worse in Western
Europe and the Polish Jewish problem becoming more acute,
Rosen slowly came around to the view that Biro-Bidjan should
be considered.
[Oct-Nov 1934: Joint
representatives inspect Biro-Bidjan / Birobidzhan]
With his closest co-workers, Lubarsky, Grower, and Zaichik, he
made a trip through Biro-Bidjan in October and November 1934.
His observations in no way different from previous reports,
such as those of a committee of experts sent by the
pro-Communist ICOR group in New York in 1929, or the
observations of David A. Brown, who visited the territory in
1932. It was clear that a great deal of investment would be
needed to make the territory feasible for agricultural
settlement. But Rosen was now more optimistic than he had been
before;
[Soviet regime uses force
labor for infrastructure works in Biro-Bidjan / Birobidzhan]
the government had promised large sums (p.92)
to improve the land and was employing kulak prisoners and Red
army men to build roads, railroads, and drainage canals.
Rosen's major point was that the Soviet government had offered
a place of refuge, and that could not be refused.
[Agro-Joint leadership
organized Biro-Bidjan /
Birobidzhan for
eventual emigration of Polish Jewry]
The JDC leadership now convened to discuss the situation. To
people like James N. Rosenberg the situation was simple: "Do
we wish to give hundreds of thousands of Polish Jews an
opportunity to emigrate to a country ready and willing to open
up their borders for immigration?"
(End note 44: AJ 23, 1/26/35 [26 January 1935])
Rosen himself "conceded that years back, he had very
definitely stated that no private or philanthropic
organization should engage in this work until all the
prerequisites had been brought about; that it would entail
very large government expenditure." But now the situation was
different, and so were the needs. "There are men in the
government who feel very keenly the plight of the Jews in
Germany and elsewhere, and whose attitude certainly can be
regarded as actuated by humanitarian feelings. The importance
of Biro-Bidjan lay not so much in the immediate results as in
the development of potential possibilities for immigration."
(End note 45: AJ 86, 6/20/35 [20 June 1935])
[Plan of immigration and
financial agreement for Biro-Bidjan / Birobidzhan]
The Soviet proposal was that 1,000 Jewish families and 500
single people would be settled, some in Biro-Bidjan, some in
the Crimea (100 families) and the Ukraine, in both agriculture
and industry. The Agro-Joint would provide the money to
transport them to the Russian border and then supervise the
agricultural settlement in the Crimea and in Biro-Bidjan. The
money was to come from $ 1.2 million of AMSOJEFS bonds that
were to be handed to the Soviets. The Agro-Joint would get $
200,000 in hard currency for expenditures outside Soviet
Russia, and $ 1 million in Russian goods would be bought at
gold ruble prices. The government of the USSR would add 25
million rubles as a counterpart to the American fund.
The immigrants would be chosen by the government, as the
Agro-Joint refused to be responsible for that part of the
scheme. The newcomers would have a right to leave Russia
within a given period. But the whole question of citizenship
and military service (p.93)
was still not agreed upon by the time Rosen brought up the
proposals for discussion in June 1935.
[June 1935: JDC meetings
about Biro-Bidjan
/ Birobidzhan - Stalin regime takes over the
costs - Polish government is also interested - work of Joint
in Poland without effect]
At these meetings, at one of which members of ICA participated
with JDC executives, Rosen explained this scheme further. In
contrast to South America and other countries outside of
Palestine, Biro-Bidjan was the only undeveloped country in the
world where there were vast immigration possibilities for
thousands or hundreds of thousands of people, and it was the
only country where the government would be willing to bear the
major part of the cost, thanks to the fact that the Russian
government was anxious to promote settlement in those Far
Eastern regions.
In his informal discussions with the Polish officials, Rosen
gathered that the Polish government was alive to the problem
of the Jews, knew that they could not be absorbed in Poland,
and would help in any plan to send large numbers out of the
country. "As I see the whole question", he said, "practically
every country in Europe is trying to push the Jews out as a
foreign body - some in a gross way - some in a finer way."
Only Russia was prepared not only not to push Jews out but
actually to take them in.
From what I know of the work
of JDC, the (Reconstruction) Foundation, ICA, etc., I must
say quite frankly that a good deal of this very important
work - I do not want to minimize it - a good deal of the
so-called reconstruction work that has been carried on is
not in the real meaning of the word reconstructive. There is
no use hiding your heads under your tails. ... The people
assisted there remain just petty traders with the few rubles
(sic!) you give them. The younger generation is not getting
the advantages of Umschichtung
(occupational restratification) in the real meaning of the
word. The kassas
are making visible efforts, but they are all comparatively
insignificant. This applies to the loan kassas in all
countries.
The competition was great, Rosen went on, and it was highly
doubtful if they could hold on very much longer. The Russians
were "honest and decent and sincere" in their opposition to
anti-Semitism and their support for a complete equality of
opportunity. (p.94)
[Rosen: Russia is projected
to be the main immigrant country for Jews]
Generally, he said, "there is no specific Jewish problem in
Russia except an insignificant one - that of helping a few of
the religious people out", and he was doing that. As for the
rest, Russia was becoming a country of immigration,
the country of
immigration, and it would be irresponsible not to utilize
that.
Rosen also suggested a scheme whereby machinery would be
imported into Russia by a JDC financial operation; this would
add working funds to the Agro-Joint in Russia. But it was the
immigration scheme that aroused discussion and interest.
(End note 46: AJ 13, 6/15/35 [15 June 1935])
Rosen, as he had made abundantly clear, was not a Communist.
At a press conference held in 1931,
(End note 47: AJ 2, 11/12/31 [12th November 1931])
Rosen had declared that he was not a Bolshevik. But, he added,
the Russian government had approached the Jewish problem
better than any other government had done, and for this it
should receive full recognition. There was more to it than
that, however. His close working relations with Soviet
Officials had led him to appreciate the positive side of the
Soviet regime, and he was undoubtedly impressed with the
sincerity of those officials - unfortunately unknown to us -
who made the offer.
[1935: 21 German Jewish
doctors immigrating to Russia]
In 1935 it was clear to him that it was not the hope of
acquiring hard currency that influenced Soviet thought, for
the Soviets had developed a favorable balance of payments and
they were producing gold in large quantities. It was other
aspects of the project that interested them. As an experiment,
they had accepted 21 German Jewish doctors who had been
screened by JDC; for the most part these doctors came from
refugee barracks in France.
[Doubts in JDC about
Biro-Bidjan / Birobidzhan]
The attitudes of the participants in the discussions varied.
Lessing Rosenwald had doubts, but these were centered more on
the climate and the fact that Biro-Bidjan was so close to the
Japanese border than on the implications arising from the
establishment of a Soviet Jewish state. As far as he was
concerned, he said, "that would not enter his consideration.
Those people who would want to seize on that as an argument
would find it." Dr. Oungre of ICA and Alexander Kahn and Dr.
Cyrus Adler of JDC opposed the project because they doubted
the stability of Soviet conditions and (p.95)
were afraid of the antireligious activities of the Soviets.
[Warburg's arguments for
Biro-Bidjan / Birobidzhan - green light for Biro-Bidjan]
Warburg argued that the Russians had always honored their
debts, that they were sincere, and that no one knew what would
become of the three million Jews in Poland. This opportunity
should not be rejected, he said. The calm reigning at the
moment in Russo-Polish relations might not last, and the
opportunity should be grasped now. This was the attitude that
was finally adopted by a large majority of those consulted,
and Rosen was given the green light.
(End note 48: AJ 86, 6/20/35 [20 June 1935])
