[2.8. First Stalinist terror wave - all plans for
Biro-Bidjan / Birobidzhan end in smoke 1936]
[1935-1936: First Stalinist
terror wave - Biro-Bidjan / Birobidzhan is not an aim any
more]
However, fate intervened. The documents themselves are meager,
and we can only rely on Rosen's cables advising JDC that
difficulties had arisen, that postponements were essential,
and that negotiations were proceeding. This, one must
remember, was the period of the first great wave of Stalinist
terror, after the assassination of Kirov in December 1934.
It would seem that those who had proposed the scheme to Rosen
were the very persons who belonged to the forces that were
destined to be purged; the Stalinist bureaucracy and ideology
were hardly susceptible to the kind of argument advanced in
favor of mass Jewish immigration into the Soviet Union.
On October 21, 1935, Rosen cabled that under the pressure of
certain government departments, COMZET insisted that foreign
organizations should not carry on direct operative work in
Biro-Bidjan but should confine themselves to merely helping
immigrants come to Russia; the actual development and
settlement work there should be carried on by government
agencies. "We prefer keeping out of Biro-Bidjan altogether
until attitudes are changed or substantially modified."
(End note 49: AJ 99)
[23th July 1936: Rosen
reports that Stalin instigates a process wave against Jewish
immigrants]
With Biro-Bidjan no longer on the agenda, various palliatives
were considered. The negotiations dragged on throughout the
spring and summer of 1936, until they finally exploded in
July. In a final letter, dated July 23, 1936, Rosen attributes
the failure to the changed situation, internationally and
internally.
One of the German Jewish
doctors whom we brought in is being accused of having been
in the service of the Gestapo, and two of (p.96)
the Polish Jewish immigrants have been exposed as informers
of the Polish Intelligence Service. These Polish Jews came
in not through us, but the effect as far as the government
is concerned is the same. In the case of the Jewish doctor,
it is possible that he had been denounced by his
father-in-law, who is an Aryan and a Nazi official. ... It
is true that one out of over 100 doctors is a small
percentage but, as the Russians say, "One drop of tar spoils
a barrel of honey."
[Rosen's critics against JDC
that they never said "Thank you" to Stalin]
Rosen still had hopes that Litvinov's influence might change
the negative attitude of officialdom, but he also accused JDC
of never giving favorable publicity to the Soviet help for
Russian Jewry. "We have never really helped the Russians to
make political capital on their Jewish policy." He proposed to
remedy this by having Herbert Samuel express to the Soviet
ambassador in London the thanks of Jews all over the world for
the immigration opportunities already afforded to Jewish
refugees;
(End note 50: Ibid. [AJ 99])
this suggestion was not acted upon. Nor did Litvinov seem to
be able to help very much.
[Stalin's persecution mania
against foreigners]
Russian suspicion of the foreigner and his works was
transformed into a collective persecution mania under Stalin,
and the immigration project was allowed to die quietly.
[10 Sep 1937: Rosen reports
the immigration plan
to Biro-Bidjan /
Birobidzhan is dropped]
On September 10, 1937, Rosen declared that the Russians had
dropped the idea, and he added that he himself would not have
the courage to suggest an immigration project at that point.
(End note 51: AJ 35a)
The whole affair was never made public, then or later, but it
shows clearly which way the collective mind of JDC was
turning. The solution of the Polish problem was its major
preoccupation. Only the 1936/7 wave of terror in Russia made
Rosen declare that even he would not have the courage to bring
additional Jews into the Soviet Union under the circumstances
then prevailing.
