[2.11. Final
discussion about the sense of the Agro-Joint work and the
Jewish colonies in Russia]
[1940: Baerwald's question
where the Jewish colonies are]
As to the colonies, they [the members of Agro-Joint after
1937] seemed to have suffered a great deal under the impact of
the terror. Equally important in their lack of success was the
pull of the towns and their growing industries. Baerwald
stated in 1940 that "Weizmann says (that) Russian colonization
has not proved a success. Most people have left (the) colonies
as he always said they would. Have you any definite news or
views on numbers still remaining in (the) colonies?"
(End note 53: AJ 25, 2/20/40 [20 February 1940])
There was no answer. Weizmann apparently had been right. Then
the flood came, and the Jewish colonies were wiped off the
face of the earth by Hitler's hordes.
[Addition: There were Stalin deportations 1939-1941 and there
was the Big Flight before in 1941 to the inner of the Soviet
Union so many Jews could be saved, about 1 mio. minimum].
[Rosen: Without Agro-Joint
Jewry in Russia would have perished]
Evaluation of the Agro-Joint work presents a very complicated
problem. Rosen's dictum was that if JDC had not turned to
colonization work, great numbers of Russian Jews "would
undoubtedly (p.99)
have literally perished. While at present the government would
undoubtedly continue the work, should the Agro-Joint
terminate, it would not have started it without our initiative
and our actually originating it."
(End note 54: AJ 66, 10/8/31 [8 October 1931])
The first part of the statement is probably true as regards
those 10,000 or 12,000 families settled by the Agro-Joint
before the relative improvement of conditions in the early
1930s. The second part is more doubtful. But there is no doubt
that tens of thousands of Jews were saved from economic
disaster by being settled on the land. This itself enabled the
Agro-Joint to do its so-called "non-Agro" work, and that
alleviated conditions all over the former Pale of Settlement.
[Balance: Results of
Agro-Joint work]
The medical institutions, the trade schools, the various
kassas and aid societies - they were all by-products of the
colonies, and they were a blessing to hundreds of thousands of
human beings in a very difficult situation. The very presence
of an American Jewish organization was of great value and
should not be underestimated.
The reinstatement of the Jewish
lishentsy in June 1930, the change in
attitude toward the mutual aid societies, the opportunities
for help to the Zionist pioneers, on one hand, and Orthodox
rabbis and some of their followers on the other, the hundreds
that were enabled to leave Russia because of Rosen's
intervention - all these must be taken into account.
[Motives of motivation for
supporting the Agro-Joint work]
What were the motivations of the people who supported this
work - apart from their having been influenced by the truly
great personality of Rosen? They were mostly men of rather
limited social and political vision, but of great
sincerity and considerable wealth. They were rarely in the
mood for philosophizing, but William Rosenwald's account of
his father's motivation contains a most interesting
philosophy:
He believed that Jews, given
an opportunity to become productive, self-supporting
citizens in their native lands, would succeed. He wanted to
show that Jews can earn their livelihood by the sweat of
their brows. He believed that emigration could not solve the
(p.100)
mass problem of Jews in Eastern and Central Europe. So he
welcomed the opportunity afforded in Soviet Russia for Jews
to prove that they could be self-supporting farmers and
industrial workers on a large scale.
These achievements, under Rosen's guidance, were thought of as
permanent improvements, not palliative measures.
(End note 55: AJ 62a, February 1938)
Several attitudes were inextricably interwoven in this
statement by Rosenwald: the feeling of inferiority of the
Western Jew toward his surroundings, contained
-- in the hope that the Jews could be just as good as others,
given the opportunity (not that they were as good, but that
they would have to prove they were, because prima facie they
were not);
-- the belief that Eastern and Central European Jews should
stay where they were, especially since there was no practical
possibility for them to go anywhere els;
-- and the inherent romanticism of a wealthy American Jew
cooperating with the Soviet authorities in turning the Jew
into a farmer and peasant.
[And the SU government lets help and gets it's profit by the
help].
19 century liberalism and Jewish Reform and a great deal of
goodwill cooperated to produce this attitude.
[Anti-Zionism as a
pre-condition for Agro-Joint's existence in Russia]
Of course, anti-Zionism entered the field as well. Lessing
Rosenwald, as we have seen, was not opposed to a Jewish state
in Biro-Bidjan - that would be a Bolshevik creation owing
allegiance to the Soviet Union, and would not embarrass a
Western Jew politically. But Zionism was different, and
"should a national homeland be established in Palestine, I
believe it would be one of the greatest catastrophes that
could possibly happen."
(End note 56: Executive Committee, 9/20/38 [20 September
1938])
Dr. Maurice B. Hexter, a moderate supporter of JDC who was a
non-Zionist and worked with the Jewish Agency in the
upbuilding of Palestine in the 1930s, expressed the opinion
that "it would be an inhuman blunder to arouse hopes in the
breasts of our unfortunate brethren, to imply and to state
that Palestine can solve their entire problems, even if one
has faith (I for one do not have it) in the astronomic
predictions of the absorptive capacity of either Palestine as
a whole, or of the portion proposed for the Jewish state under
the partition. There would still remain hundreds of thousands
(p.101)
who would not be taken care of and for whom other outlets must
be sought."
(End note 57: Palestine Post, 3/3/38 [3 March 1938])
Warburg and Baerwald did not share the extreme anti-Zionism of
Lessing Rosenwald; the cooperated with Weizmann of the Jewish
Agency, whom they admired and in a way feared. But they were
equally opposed to the radical nationalism of the majority of
the Zionist movement. Besides, they too could not see how
little Palestine could solve the problem of East European
Jewry. Agro-Joint work at least helped solve the Russian Jews'
economic problem. It might be a beacon to follow, and Polish
Jews might perhaps go the same route.
They were all subject to the limitation that Rosen himself
labored under, when he declared that "there is no specific
Jewish problem in Russia anymore."
(End note 58: AJ - uncatalogued materials; file: Russia,
settlement of emigrants, 1935, draft verbatim notes of
informal meeting, 6/15/35 [15 June 1935], Rosen's speech, p.3)
[The main thing: Economic
help to self-help]
They all saw Russian Jewry in purely economic terms. Even in
those terms they only saw the present, and failed to consider
the implications inherent in Soviet economic development. With
the pull of the cities and the lack of an ideological
counterpull, the town-bound tradition of the Jews would induce
them to abandon agricultural areas as long as there was no
compelling economic reason to remain. only an insignificant
proportion at best would remain on the land surrounded by
farmers of other nationalities. This would probably have been
true even had there been no German invasion [and of the NS
allies]. But the point is that Jewish existence did not
consist solely of economic factors, important as these were.
When Warburg was asked to comment on the persecution of rabbis
in the Soviet Union, he answered that while he deeply deplored
this situation, one must not forget that the Soviet government
was helping the Jews get back on their feet economically. The
philanthropist saw the problem almost solely in terms of bread
and butter. The faith of the nation, its cultural and
political freedom, its past values and future hopes - whether
Orthodox or secular, liberal or Zionist - were of marginal
concern. The Reform Jew wanted to break down the barriers
between the Jew and his neighbor, whereas the Russian Jews by
and large clung to certain vestiges of separateness. (p.102)
[Jewish development away from
industry to government jobs]
In the end, the breakdown of barriers did not succeed. Jews
left not only agriculture but also, to an ever-increasing
extent, factory work as well. They concentrated in the
Commissariats of Trade and Commerce, in the professions, in
the bureaucracies of the industrial establishment and their
accounting departments.
[The question: Was Agro-Joint
worth the money?]
In the long run the Agro-Joint work in Russia brought few
results. What of the short run? Was it worth spending $
16 million between 1924 and 1938 for that purpose?
(End note 59: AJ 2, reports, résumé by M.A. Leavitt, 3/20/45
[20 March 1945])
A very good case can be made that this was not only good, but
essential. Others have pointed out that this money could have
been used in Palestine to better purpose, but what better
purpose was there than saving Jews from hunger? Was it, after
all, possible to take the Jews out of Russia and send them to
Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s? If not, what should Jewish
philanthropists have done with them? There was certainly a
case to be made, then and later, for concentrating all efforts
solely on Palestine. But not very many, even in the Zionist
camp, dared to put a Palestine-centered demand quite as
exclusively as that. Rosen settled 60,000 Jews on the land.
This was considerably more than the agricultural settlement in
Palestine had achieved in the comparable period, working
without government help and with less expertise than Rosen's
team could command.
[Balance: Figures of Jewish
settlements by Agro-Joint]
The final results of the colonization work were themselves
rather unclear. How many families did the Agro-Joint settle in
Russia? The figure is apparently close to 60,000 persons. The
estimates vary between 14,000 to 20,000 families, but it is
reasonably certain that not more than 14,000 families remained
on the land by 1938, probably considerably less than that.
Kahn's estimate was that the total Jewish farming population
in 1941 amounted to some 160,000 persons and that some 70,000
more were connected to the land by having vegetable plots on
the outskirts of towns and villages. It seems to us that of
these, some 50,000 to 60,000 had been settled by the
Agro-Joint.
(End note 60: Based on AJ 2, reports, résumé by B. Hahn,
10/31/44 [31th October 1944]; ibid., statement of Russian
activities, 3/16/34 [16 March 1934]; file 35a, report by M.C.
Troper, 12/10/36 [10 December 1936])
[Crimea 1934: Foundation of
big Jewish settlements]
In about 1934 a consolidation of the tracts settled by the
Jewish settlers in the Crimea took place. Villages were united
under a common administration, and five autonomous Jewish
districts (p. 103)
were founded (Freidorf in February 1931, Stalindorf in June
1930, Kalinindorf in March 1937, New Zlatopol in 1929, and
Larindorf in January 1935).
[Last hope: Opening of the
documents]
This was the sum total of the work that ended in the eviction
of the Agro-Joint and in the arrest and death of most,
possibly all, of its Russian Jewish officials. There were
achievements and there were disasters. The full story will
have to wait until the Agro-Joint files in Russia are opened
to scholarly inspection at some future date.
