As we have seen, the crisis
in Germany did not find JDC entirely unprepared. The
warnings of Dr. Kahn and the rumblings of the rising Nazi
tide in Germany had focused the attention of the
organization upon the German scene even before the advent of
Hitler. Once the Nazis came to power, it was only natural
that JDC should try to come to the aid of German Jewry.
However, the attitude of JDC was contested within the inner
circle of its own leadership - this despite the fact that
most of its lay leaders were descendants of German Jewish
immigrants to the U.S. or had themselves been born in
Germany.
[1933: Discussions in the
JDC about actions in Nazi Germany]
During the first months of 1933, discussions of whether JDC
should enter the German picture at all were held in New
York. Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the New York Times thought
that JDC was
making a fundamental and
woeful blunder in this connection. It seems to me
impossible to conceive that 600,000 persons in Germany can
be supported from now on from any outside community. Since
this obligation cannot be carried out, it should not be
assumed. To do so, in my judgment, merely relieved the
German Government of its responsibility that now rests
upon it to permit its citizens an equality to earn their
own livelihood.
(End note 1: Arthur Sulzberger to Max J. Kohler, 5/29/33
[29 May 1933], CON 21
At a Board of Directors meeting in July, James N. Rosenberg
argued that there was no point in providing relief for the
Jews in (p.105)
Germany, because JDC simply did not have the means to do so.
The aim of the organization should be to get the German
government to agree to a program of reconstruction. In this,
JDC might be of some help.
(End note 2: James N. Rosenberg at Board of Directors
meeting, 7/11/33 [11th July 1933])
The majority of the organization's leaders, however, adopted
Dr. Bernhard Kahn's attitude that "the liberal principle in
business had met its end in Germany", and that JDC must help
German Jews enter into those economic fields in which they
were still allowed. He was certainly in favor of
constructive efforts in Germany: "Even if a district
attorney can only open a stenographic office, that is surely
better than if these people leave the country and go
completely to wrack and ruin."
But Kahn was very much against limiting JDC help to
reconstruction only. He foresaw the necessity of providing
funds to create new schools for Jewish children. At the same
time, he thought that Palestine was at least a partial
answer to those who could no longer stay in Germany: "Jewish
youth and the younger adult must have a permanent land to
which to go and, under the circumstances, this can only be
Palestine. Of course, exceptionally large amounts are
required for the preparation of Palestine and the work for
this preparation. For this purpose special means must be
provided."
(End note 3: Dr. Bernhard Kahn at an Executive Committee
meeting, 6/27/33 [27 June 1933])
The first immediate problem as far as Germany was concerned
was political. Zionists and others demanded protests in the
form of Jewish mass meetings. Kahn's opinion was expressed
after meeting Morris D. Waldman, the secretary of the
American Jewish Committee. He thought that Jewish mass
meetings would be useless and might even be harmful.
However, he foresaw a time when such meetings, particularly
with the participation of prominent non-Jews, might become
necessary.
(End note 4: Kahn cable to New York, 3/19/33 [19 March
1933], 14-47)
In the ensuing months he was to stick to this opinion. On
March 21, 1933, Paul Baerwald cabled to the State Department
in Washington, asking that American protection be given to
the JDC offices in Berlin. That same day, the American
Jewish Committee and the B'nai B'rith of America published a
protest against Hitler that was published in the
New York Times. This
apparently was considered to be a moderate form of (p.106)
public intervention; friends of JDC in Germany (for example,
Edward Baerwald, brother of Paul Baerwald) were opposed to
more militant protests.
(End note 5: Eduard Baerwald to New York, 3/19/33 [19 March
1933], ibid [14-47])
[1933: Kahn is warned to
leave Berlin - Kahn returns to New York]
It was soon clear to Kahn that his position as the European
director of JDC was untenable as long as he remained in
Berlin. During the last days of March, Kahn prepared his
departure. On April 1 he cabled from Paris that the removal
of his offices had become unavoidable. He had been
personally warned, semiofficially, that because of his
connection with the widely hated American Jewish community,
his departure from Germany would be desirable. He added:
"Future passing of German border not possible without
special visa which I very likely would not get; nevertheless
prepared return by end week." He never stood on German soil
again.
(End note 6: Kahn to New York, 4/1/33 [1 April 1933], ibid.
[14-47])
[1933: Discussions about
protests and interventions of the Red Cross]
The next day, April 2, Kahn asked for protest meetings along
nonsectarian lines, emphasizing the humanitarian interest in
what was happening in Germany. However, such protests were
to take place only if negotiations then in progress between
influential Jews in London and the Nazis were fruitless.
Joseph C. Hyman went to Washington to see William Phillips
and Pierrepont Moffat at the State Department with this
message on April 4. On April 6 a meeting was held at the
home of Paul Baerwald, where the leadership of the German
Jewish aristocracy in the United States convened.
Participants included Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Ludwig
Fogelstein, Irving Lehman, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, Judge
Rosenman, Solomon Lowenstein, James Marshall, Frederick M.
Warburg, Judge Proskauer, Jonah B. Wise, and others. The
suggestion was made that the whole situation be turned over
to the International Red Cross, but the argument was
advanced that IRC could not act except through the local
societies of the Red Cross, which would mean that in
practice the German Red Cross would have to intervene more
or less against the wishes of the German government.
Proskauer, Lehman, and others were very much against what
they called "separatist Jewish protests", and wanted
whatever protests (p.107)
were made to remain on a purely humanitarian and
nonsectarian level.
(End note 7: Meeting at the home of Paul Baerwald, 4/6/33 [6
April 1933], ibid. [14-47])
[Funds to the Hilfsverein
CV]
Kahn was asked by cable whether funds could be sent into
Germany. His first reply on April 12 was that funds could
indeed be sent and that the best people to handle such funds
would be the Hilfsverein or CV (Central-Verein deutscher
Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens), the political organization
of liberal Jewry in Germany.
[The Joint has no right to
demonstrate]
As a nonpolitical organization, JDC could not be involved in
any demonstrations against German persecution of the Jews.
Such protests, if made, had to be left to the American
Jewish Committee, whose leadership, as we have seen, was to
a certain extend identical with that of JDC.
[April 1933: British Jews
want that Felix M. Warburg will make pressure on British
prime Minister MacDonald who will be in "USA"]
Influential British Jews tried to convince Felix M. Warburg
to put pressure on the American government to try to
influence the British government to intervene in behalf of
German Jewry. The British prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald,
was in the United States during the latter part of April,
but Warburg did not place much hope on any direct contact
that Jewish leaders might have with the British premier.
(End note 8: F.M. Warburg to Lord Reading, 4/22/33 [22th
April 1933], ibid. [14-47])
[Kahn: JDC has to defend
every Jewish position in Germany]
The immediate problem confronting JDC was what to do about
the new situation that had arisen in Germany. The first
reaction was well summed up by Dr. Kahn, who wrote in the
memorandum from which we have already quoted that he was of
the opinion that JDC could not give up German Jewry as
completely lost. JDC had to defend to the last every
position that the Jews still held in Germany.
(End note 9: Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden, Dr. Kahn's
material, 1931-1940, memo of 6/27/33 [27 June 1933])
[Hyman states that the
young German-Jewish generation has to be prepared for
emigration]
This did not mean that JDC was opposed to the emigration of
large numbers of German Jews. The panic exodus that followed
the Nazis' assumption of power would have made any such
position hopeless in any case. The policy of JDC was
enunciated clearly by Hyman when he said that, in line with
the wishes of the German Jewish body, "there is no hope for
the younger generation; that it is therefore necessary
to make this group capable of productive activity by being
trained to vocations of agriculture, handicraft, and the
like", in order to settle outside of Germany.
(End note 10: J.C. Hyman to Judge Irving Lehman, 7/14/33 [14
July 1933], R19)
[Kahn predicts: Emigration
is necessary, because the conditions will be worse]
Kahn added that emigration was a necessary part of any
future action in Germany. His own opinion was that the
tragedy was of (p.108)
such dimensions that one feared to consider its issue. He
was convinced that the conditions would not improve. "On the
contrary, they must become worse."
(End note 11: Kahn, 4/28/33 [28 April 1933], 14-47)
[JDC fund raising persons
in Nazi Germany]
One of the immediate steps that JDC took was to send its
chief fund raiser, Rabbi Jonah B. Wise, into Germany to try
to arrange for a German counterpart to JDC, which would be
capable of receiving funds from America and distributing
them in line with JDC policy. A leader in this endeavor was
Max M. Warburg, Felix M. Warburgs's brother, the head of the
family banking house in Hamburg. Also involved were Karl
Melchior, a high German official and a partner of Warburg in
the Hamburg firm, Dr. Cora Berliner, Ludwig Tietz, a
physician and a well-known public figure, and others.
