[A. Destruction of the Jewish
existence in Poland 1929-1939]
[5.8. Claims abroad of anti-Semitic Poland for
emigration of Polish Jewry]
[1938: Conference of
Evian: claims of anti-Semitic Poland for emigration of
Polish Jewry]
When President Roosevelt called upon the nations of the
world to meet in Evian in July 1938 to discuss the problem
of refugees from Germany, the Polish government also swung
into action and demanded that the Evian Conference discuss
the problem of Jewish emigration from Poland.
The Americans and British refused, but the Poles tried to
press the Jews themselves to ask for the inclusion of the
Polish Jewish problem at Evian. In the course of this
campaign the Polish ambassador in Washington, Count
Potocki, approached the American Jewish Committee and JDC
(on June 8, 1938). He asked for an emigration of 50,000 a
year, and alleged that the relatively small emigration of
30,000 in 1935 had had a psychologically calming effect on
Polish anti-Semitism.
(End note 49: Conversation between Potocki, Waldman, and
Hyman, 6/8/38 [8 June 1938], CON-2)
(Actually, after the "calming effect" of the 1935
emigration, pogrom activity increased sharply in late 1935
and in 1936. Nevertheless, the argument that emigration
would be an effective way of avoiding anti-Semitic
outbursts became a deeply ingrained belief among Jewish
leaders in Poland).
[1937: New York: Polish
consul Gruszka states that Jewish emigration would help
democracy...]
In a more subtle way the same point was made in
discussions held in New York in October 1937 between the
Polish consul general, Sylvester Gruszka, and JDC. Gruszka
also demanded emigration. He intimated that
-- this would aid the democratic and liberal wing in the
Polish government in their struggle against Polish
reaction,
-- and that therefore the support of American Jewry for
Poland was very important.
-- He asked specifically that the New York Times be
persuaded to desist from anti-Polish articles,
-- that the influx of American Jewish capital into Poland
be organized,
-- and that JDC help in eliminating from the public scene
in Poland those American Jewish organizations that the
Poles considered objectionable.
[The main problem, the economy, will not be solved by
this].
[American Federation of
Polish Jews (AFPJ): Campaigns against anti-Semitism -
Gruszka wants to play the Jewish organizations off
against each other]
This last referred to the American Federation of (p.194)
Polish Jews, which was conducting a propaganda campaign
with largely political overtones against anti-Semitism.
There was considerable Zionist influence on AFPJ, and it
was even trying to collect money for Polish causes in the
U.S., which in the eyes of JDC was wrong. When Gruszka
tried to use the animosity between the two Jewish
organizations in order to put them against each other,
however, Hyman refused to cooperate.
The AFPJ, he told Gruszka, was quite useful, if only they
would stop competitive fund raising. He and Kahn "stated
very definitely that we could not assent to the idea of
permitting any pressure to be brought upon the Jews of
Poland in relation to the Federation."
(End note 50: Conversation between Gruszka, Kahn, and
Hyman, 10/17/37 [17 October 1937], CON-2)
[Gruszka: JDC is the main
development aid for Poland]
At the same time, Gruszka intimated that JDC was after all
the source of most of the money sent to Poland, and its
cooperation was needed for any development connected with
the modernization of Polish industry, the advancement of
Polish exports to the U.S., and the emigration of Jews.
[The chameleon of the
Polish policy abroad (facade) and at home (reality)]
In planning its policy in Poland, JDC had to take into
account the difference between the utterances of Polish
representatives abroad and the actual policy of the Polish
government vis-à-vis the Jews. Abroad, the pressure for
Jewish emigration was coupled both with plans for the
modernization of the Polish economy and with statements
expressing the hope that the Jews who would remain in
Poland would be assimilated politically and become
patriotic Poles.
[Anti-Semitic Poland: JDC
Giterman reports fair treatment of the Jews would result
in voting out of politicians]
The Jews in Poland were loyal to Poland (if for no other
reason than that the alternatives in the 1930s were Nazi
Germany or Soviet Russia), but in actual practice the
Polish government did not tend to act on such optimistic
and relatively friendly premises. The head of the JDC
office in Poland, Isaac Giterman, declared quite bluntly -
on the basis of very full knowledge of Polish policy
toward Jews - that there simply was no possibility of a
more liberal treatment of the Jews. Polish anti-Semitism
was inherent in the local population, and any minister who
treated the Jews fairly would lose his position.
(End note 51: 44-6-Neville Laski report, August 1934)
