[A. Destruction of the Jewish
existence in Poland 1929-1939]
[5.9. JDC work in anti-Semitic Poland: Kassas -
Jewish starvation]
[1930s: Anti-Semitic
Poland: JDC gives no support to Polish Jews - help only
in special cases like floods or after pogroms]
In the face of these obstacles and difficulties, the
policy of JDC was intractable and heartrending. In the
1930s JDC
continued to
(p.195)
refuse to spend
its monies on relief.
[There is the suspicion that also JDC was in line with the
Zionists to exterminate the Yiddish speaking Jews].
But that policy could not always be maintained. There were
natural disasters, such as the floods in Galicia in the
summer of 1934, which caused damage estimated at 1 million
zloty ($ 200,000). The Polish government established a
"nonsectarian" relief committee (with one Jewish
representative) and JDC contributed $ 10,000, or 5 % of
the sum that was needed.
Then there were man-made disasters. After each pogrom, JDC
stepped in to save whatever could be saved. Its Free Loan
kassas were
strengthened in localities hit by the outrages, and the
child care, health, and educational institutions supported
by JDC increased their allocations to help as best they
could.
Some of the items that appeared in JDC budgets as
constructive help through the support of organizations
were in fact little more than intelligently - indeed,
constructively - applied relief to stricken communities.
[JDC industrialization
plans for Poland]
Generally speaking, however, in its approach to the Polish
Jewish problem JDC moved more and more in the direction of
the industrialization plans advanced by Kahn. The sums
devoted to Poland were increasing, and there seemed to be
an opportunity for testing Kahn's plans.
[The industrialization which Stalin performs in Soviet
Union in the 1930s is performed in Poland only since
1950].
[JDC kassas are partly
not operating!]
The problem of the industrialization plans was intimately
connected with the future of the Free Loan and
Reconstruction Foundation loan
kassas. The older, more conservative
loan
kassas were
able to help those who were in a stronger economic
position by loans with a low rate of interest. We have
also seen that the position of these
kassas weakened as a
result of the 1929 economic crisis.
On paper there were still 680 such institutions in Poland
in 1933, but an indeterminate number of these were in fact
inactive. In 1934 it was estimated that only 340 of the
601 still registered were actually operating. The figures
quoted in various JDC sources were contradictory; but by
1935 only 223 kassas were said to be in operation, and 221
more were inactive.
[1935-1937: Anti-Semitic
Poland: Reconstruction Foundation for reorganizing the
JDC kassas]
The Reconstruction Foundation stepped in, and throughout
1935-37 tried hard to reorganize the
kassas. Their
importance lay, after all, in the fact that large numbers
of small traders, artisans, (p.196)
and small manufacturers, as well as members of the
intelligentsia, had recourse to them. Even in early 1936
the number of active members was estimated to be over
47,000. There was an umbrella organization of these
kassas, largely influenced by Zionist elements. This
group, the Verband, had no financial responsibilities, but
was supposed to supervise the kassas and to see to it that
the rules and regulations were observed. It was not at all
efficient.
In the autumn of 1936 Kahn and ICA [Jewish Colonization
Association] intervened decisively and declared that they
would maintain direct contact with the kassas and no
longer work through the Verband.
[May 1937: Anti-Semitic
Poland: Reconstruction Foundation sets up Central
Financial Institution under Karol Sachs]
Despite the negative experience with the Central Bank in
the early 1930s, the Reconstruction Foundation set up a
new Central Financial Institution, headed by its own
nominees from the conservative and largely assimilated
group around the Jewish industrialist Karol Sachs. Sachs
received the highest accolade JDC could bestow on a Polish
Jew: he was placed "in the class of our own leaders in
America".
(End note 52: r10, Troper report, 2/17/39 [17 February
1939])
The institution was set up in May 1937, and from then on
the Reconstruction Foundation gave its credits to the
kassas through it,
leaving the Verband to deal with questions of organization
and rules. In 1937 the foundation appropriated 1 million
zloty ($ 200,000) to reorganize and revitalize
kassas, under the
prodding of its very effective deputy director, Noel
Aronovici.
[1932-1937: Kassa work
without industrialization]
At the same time, the foundation [Reconstruction
Foundation] was pursuing an essentially conservative
policy. Between 1932 and 1935, during and after the
dissolution of the Central Bank, the foundation actually
withdrew more monies from the
kassas than it gave them in credits.
(End note 53: Between 1932 and 1934, 745,000 zloty were
granted in credits and 2,394,000 zloty received in
repayment (46-reports 36/7, memorandum of 9/30/37 [30
September 1937])
This money was not returned to the foundation, but kept in
Poland. It was not reinvested, however, until the new
Central Financial Institution had been set up in 1937/8.
In 1937 the foundation books showed a reserve of $ 494,000
in cash, and its total expenditure in credits granted that
year was considerably less than that. ICA had no real wish
to invest the monies in doubtful industrialization plans
in Poland, and so the kassas carried on with their work of
helping those whose economic situation was
sound. At the end of
1937, 241 (p.197)
kassas were
functioning and 161 more were awaiting reorganization; 205
others were defunct and had to be liquidated.
[Supplement: There comes up a severe and logic suspicion:
Industrialization in Poland should be realized only
without the Yiddish Jews. The anti-Semitic Polish
government did not want that the Jews would integrate by
industrialization as the integrated in the Soviet Union.
So the Yiddish Jews should first be exterminated before
industrialization comes in Poland in the 1950s].
At the same time, the Reconstruction Foundation included
in its work program loan kassas organized by merchants on
an occupational rather than general basis. The functioning
kassas included 37 such merchants' institutions, which
were really small merchants' banks; these were quite
successful. Kassa membership in Poland at the end of 1937
numbered some 68,000.
[Loan kassas of the
Reconstruction Foundation help reinstall Jewish business
from inner Polish Jewish refugees in the towns]
As we have already seen, the political situation of Polish
Jewry began to improve very slightly in early 1939.
However, the economic situation was worsening, and the
loan
kassas had
do intervene in what really amounted to a prevention of
catastrophe rather than reconstruction. While most of the
work in this respect was done by the Free Loan
kassas, the loan
kassas of the
Reconstruction Foundation also played a part. A report in
1939 claimed that in many places the
kassas had prevented
the elimination of Jewish market stalls and bakeries; Jews
who had been forced to leave their villages by the pogroms
of 1937/8 were now being helped to establish places of
business in towns. Certain projects engaged in by the more
successful artisans and traders, such as fowl fattening,
sawmills, and production of soda, were also being aided by
the kassas.
(End note 54: R60, report of 4/18/39 [18 April 1939])
[Reconstructions
Foundation is too strict - many kassas are ruined by the
foundation itself]
Relations between the
kassas
and the Reconstruction Foundation were not always happy.
The foundation did supply credits, but only on strict
terms. On the harsh conditions of economic crisis in
Poland there were occasionally bitter recriminations at
the rigid way in which agreements were interpreted. The
complaint was even heard that the foundation credits had
been collected "harshly and ruthlessly, and many kassas
have been ruined" by the foundation itself.
(End note 55: Raphael Szereszewsky, quoted in a report of
the Reconstruction Foundation, 5/22/36 [22 May 1936], WAC,
Box 347 (d)
[Supplement: That's the sense: The Yiddish Jews should not
be helped...]
Against this stood the foundation policy, which was quite
clearly "not to save the weak and unsound, but to fortify
and strengthen the sound and secure positions."
(End note 56: 44-21, Alexander Kahn report, 12/9/37 [9
December 1937])
[Popular Free Loan
kassas]
The main instrument of reconstructive work in Poland was
not, however, the loan
kassa
but the Free Loan
kassa.
These institutions, it will be remembered, were JDC
creations and had no (p.198)
contact with the Reconstruction Foundation-run
enterprises. They became immensely popular as the economic
crisis hardened, because they charged almost no interest
on loans. There were 676 such
kassas in Poland in 1933, and 841 by
1939. This meant that in practically every Jewish village
there was a
kassa
where impoverished artisans and traders and intellectuals,
and to a certain extent workers, could get loans to tide
them over difficult times. These loans were very small,
averaging about $16. But they often prevented a Jew from
becoming a public charge.
[CEKABE gives credits to
the kassas]
The central institution of the
kassas was the CEKABE,
(End note 57: Polish initials for the Central Society for
Free Credit and Furthering of Productive Work among the
Jewish Population in Poland)
through which credits were channeled to the
kassas; it also
filled the functions exercised by the Verband in regard to
the foundation loan
kassas.
[Kassa figures]
The total amounts loaned by the Free Loan
kassas were at first
considerably below those loaned by the foundation
kassas - in 1934 the
latter loaned $ 38.8 million, whereas the Free Loan
kassas only loaned $
2.2 million - but the number of free loan grew steadily
throughout the 1930s. The average sums loaned were paltry,
which in itself was an indication of the deteriorating
position of the Jews.
While the number of free loans and their general totals
were increasing, the Reconstruction Foundation
kassas' work was
declining: in 1936, the foundation kassas had loaned $
15.8 million, or 40 % of the 1934 total.
Table 13:
Free Loan Kassas in Poland
|
Year
|
No. of loans
|
Total amount (in millions of zloty)
|
Average loans (in zloty)
|
[conversion in $]
|
1933
|
135,600
|
10.7
|
79
|
($16)
|
1934
|
125,000
|
11.0
|
88
|
($ 17.60)
|
1935
|
149,214
|
14.5
|
97
|
($ 19.40)
|
1936
|
163,670
|
15.0
|
92
|
($ 18.40)
|
1937
|
191,294
|
18.0
|
94
|
($ 18.80)
|
1938
|
221,226
|
20.0
|
90
|
($ 18)
|
(End note 58: The figures are rather
problematic. There are divergences in the
reports and between one report and another. It
must be remembered that there were self-help
institutions approximating the JDC-supported
kassas in almost every locality, and many of
these were not recognized by CEKABE. Reports
from the localities were not always accurate).
|
(p.199)
With the relative increase in funds available for Poland,
Kahn returned to the idea of industrial and other
constructive investments in strategic places. In May 1935
he asked for a special yearly allocation of $ 100,000 for
that purpose. The idea was received favorably by Bearwald,
who advanced the project in a memorandum of September of
that year.
(End note 59:
-- Kahn to Warburg, 5/11/35 [11 May 1935], 15-33;
-- and 44-5, Baerwald memo, 9/18/35 [18 September 1935])
British help was solicited, and the Board of Deputies
agreed to participate in the effort.
As early as April 1934 a Jewish Economic Council (known as
Wirtschaftsrat) had been founded by CEKABE; it was run by
Isaac Giterman. This now swung into action and in 1936
started very cautiously to help in establishing small
local crafts and industries, and to supervise them, check
the quality of the products, and aid in finding
appropriate markets if necessary. This kind of rather
plodding but quite effective small-scale work went on
throughout 1937 and 1938.
[1938: Subcommittee TER
for finding export markets - financed by JDC and others]
A special subcommittee set up by the Wirtschaftsrat in
January 1938, called TER, took over the task of finding
export markets for those establishments that needed it. In
this, it was hoped, some government help would be
obtained. A total of about $ 410,000 was invested in these
ventures directly by JDC; an additional 30-40 % was found
locally.
[JDC organizes help for
families and artisans by fund raising at the
Landsmannschaften in "America"]
In addition, the call went out to certain expatriate
organizations in America, comprised of people who had
emigrated from certain localities (Landsmannschaften).
These were asked to contribute a minimum of $ 2,000, which
would be matched by JDC. Up to 1938, 250 Landsmannschaften
responded, and rather large amounts of JDC money went out
to match these small grants.
The expenditure was under the surveillance of CEKABE.
In 1937 some 5,000 families were helped by these small
ventures, which included such branches as mechanical
weaving (at Choroszcz), carpenter cooperatives (Tarnopol),
saddler's cooperatives (Chelm), and semiagricultural
pursuits, such as vegetable farming, the planting of
medicinal herbs, and the like.
[CEKABE helps families
and artisans - JDC help for families - 1 mio. Jews at or
beyond the edge of starvation]
Another venture of CEKABE was the establishment of small
dairies on the outskirts of towns. This work was carried
on in 1938. There were 2,088 families that were helped in
this way in the first (p.200)
half of the year, but we lack information for the rest of
the period, up to the outbreak of the war.
(End note 60: 46-report 1938. In 1937 Jacob Lestschinsky
produced an industrialization plan of Polish Jewry for
Simon Marks, which was based on the same principles as
Kahn's plans: "Not to save the weak and unsound, but to
fortify and strengthen the sound and secure positions."
The plan would cost $ 4 mio., of which $ 3 mio. would come
from abroad. See 44-21, Committee on Poland, 12/9/37 [9
December 1937])
By early 1938 Kahn had accumulated sufficient experience
to decide that the experiment had been worthwhile. In
January of the year [1938] he demanded a yearly allocation
of $ 1 million for this kind of economic reconstruction,
and hoped that within five years this would lead to the
employment of 23,000 families. It can safely be estimated
that up to the end of 1938 JDC had succeeded in finding
new employment in these enterprises for about 10,000
families.
This in itself was a partial success, and JDC could justly
be proud of it. Yet measured by the economic decline of
the Jewish population in Poland and by the fact that
about one million people
there were living at or beyond the edge of starvation,
the outcome of the efforts was small indeed. The basic
problem of JDC was that with its relatively small
resources it could do no more than help those who were
above the danger line from sinking below it. JDC was not a
government, and it could not solve the problem of the
starving million.
For a few years JDC was helped in its efforts by the
British Jews. In 1935 British Jews sent close to 40,000
pounds (almost $ 200,000) to Poland, to be distributed by
JDC. This was repeated in 1936. But in 1937 the
pro-Zionist and non-Zionist wings in Britain disagreed on
aid to Poland, the Zionists favoring such aid. Collections
went down, and no more real help was obtained. The help of
the British Jews, while it lasted, was important from
another angle. JDC and ICA (primarily a British
organization) had been very interested in vocational
retraining. JDC saw this as one of its main tasks.
