[J. Further
happenings in Europe 1938-1939]
[6.28.] The Rublee-Schacht episode and the
coordinating foundation [01]
[August 1938:
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR) set up]
The Evian Conference took place in July 1938. In August,
ICR [Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR), set up
at Evian 1938)] held its first meeting, and George Rublee
became its director. Then the Sudeten crisis of September
1938 had prevented further progress. The Germans were not
eager to negotiate at that time. ICR and the Jewish
organizations that placed their hopes in it, on the other
hand, assumed that a breakthrough on the emigration front
was possible only if negotiations with Germany led to an
orderly emigration of Jews from that country, and if
emigrants were allowed (p.273)
to take some capital with them and thus make themselves
more welcome in the host countries.
[21 Nov 1938: Britain:
11,000 Jewish refugees bring work for 15,000 Britons]
In the debate on refugees in the British House of Commons
on November 21, 1938, the home secretary pointedly
referred to the fact that the 11,000 refugees from Hitler
who had been admitted to Britain had already provided
employment for 15,000 Britons.
Other countries had similar expectations. The proper way
to go about emigration, argued Max M. Warburg, was "to
find jobs for German Jews on (a) similar social standard
and similar level of living as they had before."
(End note 134: 9-30, 6/26/39 [26 June 1939], Warburg to
Hyman)
The problem was, who would pay for it?
[August 1938 approx.: JDC
sees clear: Jewish emigrants need to bring some of their
money with]
JDC became convinced soon after Evian that emigration
"must in the final analysis be financed with funds from
German Jews themselves, for which it will be necessary
that an international agreement with Reich authorities be
reached permitting emigrants to take out some of their
money."
(End note 135: George Backer at Executive Committee,
9/29/38 [29 September 1938])
It was for this reason that JDC so wholeheartedly
supported Rublee, and as late as December 1938 saw in
Evian "some consolation".
(End note 136: James N. Rosenberg at JDC annual meeting,
12/20/38 [20 December 1938])
[August 1938 approx.: JDC
sees clear: New settlements in new countries need state
money]
The second point, to which JDC became converted as 1938
drew to an end and 1939 began, was even more important.
Private means, voluntary organizations - these were well
and good, but they would not be able to settle Jews in
difficult new countries. Established countries of
settlement were closing their doors. If there was to be
mass resettlement, government funds would have to be
forthcoming.
(End note 137: Executive Committee, 2/13/39 [13 February
1939])
[27 Oct 1938: Rublee plan
for Jewish emigration - similar to the later Schacht
plan]
In the autumn of 1938 Rublee was cooling his heels in
London. In October 27 [1938] he presented his own ideas on
how the emigration of German Jews should be organized. It
appears that these ideas were influenced by the diplomatic
contacts taking place in Berlin between members of the
British and American embassies and German authorities,
mainly those connected with Göring's office. At any rate,
Rublee's proposals were almost identical with those known
later as the Schacht plan. It is also likely that German
Jews were involved in transmitting the German proposals.
[Rublee plan for Jewish
emigration:
A. Trust fund in Germany to set up]
The content of these proposals was that 1.5 billion German
marks [Reichsmark], or 25 % of the total assets of German
Jewry (estimated (p.274)
at 6 billion marks, or $ 2.4 billion), would be set up as
a trust fund in Germany. Jews abroad would raise an
equivalent sum in foreign currency, which nominally would
be a loan to the emigrants. The money abroad would pay for
the actual emigration and settlement.
[B. German Jewish
emigrants shall take German goods with them and sell
abroad for German export]
German emigrants would repay the capital and the interest
in the form of German goods that they would take with them
and sell abroad, thus in effect increasing German exports.
However, this would have to be over and above the "normal"
level of German exports (whatever that meant). At any
rate, Schacht spoke of "additional exports" in this
connection.
[The Rublee plan comes
from Fischböck, controlled by Göring, and brought to
Schacht]
This plan was apparently conceived by a high Austrian Nazi
economic official, Dr. Hans Fischböck, who suggested it to
Göring. Göring in turn appears to have brought it to the
attention of Hjalmar Schacht, Germany's economic wizard
who was at that time the head of the Reichsbank.
[Nov 1938: Schacht in
London presents the Schacht plan - Hitler agrees on 2
Jan 1939]
Schacht went to London in November and presented the plan
to Winterton and Rublee. Further negotiations were to take
place with Fischböck, but Schacht apparently wanted time
to present the proposals to Hitler. He appears to have
done this on January 2, 1939, and he received Hitler's
approval.
(End note 138:
-- Wyman, op. cit. [Wyman, David S.: Paper Walls; Amherst,
Mass., 1968], pp. 53-56;
-- Morse, op. cit. [Morse, Arthur D.: While Six Million
Died; New York 1968], pp. 241-48;
-- Raul Hilberg: The Destruction of European Jews; Chicago
1961, p. 97.
All these authors rely mainly on official document
publications such as:
-- Foreign Relations of the United States 1938, 1:871-74;
1939, 2:77-87, 102-24, 95-98;
-- Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 3rd
series; London 1950, 3:675-77; and:
-- Documents on German Foreign Policy, series D,
5:753-767, 780.
Some unpublished State Department material is also quoted.
See also: Mashberg, op. cit [Mashberg, Michael: America
and the Refugee Crisis; M.A. thesis; City University of
New York, 1970])
[Jews and many non-Jews
reject the Schacht plan for emigration with exportation
of German goods]
Jews almost unanimously rejected the Schacht plan, as did
many non-Jews.
[Jan 1939: London: New
negotiations about emigration of German Jews - new
Schacht plan]
As a result of this opposition, new negotiations were
started that January in Berlin. With the help of Montagu
Norman of the Bank of England, contact was established
with the Germans; then Rublee himself came and talked with
Schacht. Ribbentrop objected to these talks, but the
Schacht-Göring group overcame that opposition. Schacht's
new proposal was much more favorable to the Jews:
[Second Schacht plan
details:
A. No additional exports]
the idea of "additional exports" was dropped,
[B. The trust is for the
Jews abroad starting a new life, for transportation and
freight expenses]
and the money in the trust fund would simply be used to
buy equipment for Jews with which they could hope to start
new lives outside Germany. This might boost German exports
incidentally, but no foreign currency would accrue to the
Reich treasury. Transport and freight expenses would also
be covered by these funds, insofar as German vessels or
other means of transport were used.
[C. Other expenses are
paid by Jewish corporation]
The Jewish corporation that would be set up abroad would
pay for all (p.275)
the other expenses. There would be no necessary connection
between that corporation and the trust fund, which was to
be run by a directorate of three: two Germans and one
non-German.
[D. 150,000 working Jews
first, then 250,000 dependent Jews - 200,000 older Jews
remain]
150,000 Jews of working age would settle abroad, to be
followed by 250,000 dependents; 200,000 others would
remain behind and be supported out of Jewish capital other
than that in the trust fund. The Germans promised that
these people would not be molested. For these 200,000,
some Jewish businesses might be reopened, and "Jews
outside of Germany would not be called upon to support
their coreligionists in the Reich."
(End note 139:
New York
Times, 2/14/39 [14 February 1939])
As soon as the scheme was started, Jews would be released
from the concentration camps.
[Negotiations about
deported German Jews in Poland]
At the same time, negotiations were opened between Germany
and Poland, and the Poles declared themselves willing to
take back into Poland 4-5,000 Polish Jews from Germany, if
they came with 70 % of their property.
(End note 140: R46, January 1939 reports)
[21 Jan 1939: Schacht
dismissed - further negotiations with Helmut Wohlthat]
In the midst of the negotiations, on January 21,
Rublee was informed that Schacht had been dismissed from
his post by Hitler, but that an official by the name of
Helmut Wohlthat had been nominated by Göring - in his
capacity as Germany's economic dictator - to continue the
negotiations. In a personal interview on January 23,
(End note 141: Ibid. [R46, January 1939 reports])
Göring assured Rublee that the German government was
serious in its intentions to see the negotiations through.
[Different opinions about
the second Schacht emigration plan]
Public opinion in Britain and the U.S. was divided on the
new plan; so were the Jews. Although the majority of the
Zionists remained opposed to the plan despite the improved
conditions, personalities like Stephen S. Wise and Louis
Lipsky voiced approval. JDC hesitated. Its labor component
was very definitely against what became to be known as the
Rublee plan. The Jewish Labor Committee had joined with
the American Jewish Congress in Supporting the boycott of
German goods, and at the JDC leadership meetings, Adolph
Held, a leading journalist of the labor wing, voiced
opposition to the scheme. The counterpart organization
that the Jews were supposed to set up would, Held thought,
recognize the right of the German government to
expropriate Jewish (p.276)
property and would destroy the boycott.
(End note 142: R55, 3/17/39, Baerwald statement and
discussion).
However, it was quite clear that unless some Jewish
counterpart to the trust fund was set up, the whole scheme
was unworkable. This again raised the whole problem of
private organizations arranging for the mass settlement of
hundreds of thousands of people with voluntary
contributions - and JDC was convinced that this was
impossible.
[British Jewish leaders
urge for a Coordinating Foundation for Jewish
emigration]
At the same time, Jewish leaders in Britain were much less
hesitant and were pressing for the establishment of a
Coordinating Foundation that would fulfill two main tasks:
it would serve as a secretariat in directing emigrants to
various places of settlement and it would invest money in
settlement projects.
["US" State Department
supports the Schacht-Rublee plan]
The Rublee plan had the full support of the American State
Department.
[At the same time the racist economy leaders of the "USA"
are supporting Third Reich more and more. Thank you
"USA"...]
[13 February 1939: Rublee
resigns - Emerson new director of the ICR]
Rublee himself resigned on February 13, 1939, having - as
he thought - accomplished his mission. The directorship of
ICR [Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR) (set up
at Evian 1938)] was taken over by Sir Herbert Emerson, the
League of Nations high commissioner for refugees.
[March 1939: "US"
government campaign for the Schacht-Rublee plan to set
up the "US"-GB Coordinating Foundation]
Myron C. Taylor was again called to help the U.S.
government, and beginning in March a most extraordinary
campaign was waged by the president, the State Department,
and Taylor, to press American Jewish organizations into
accepting the Rublee plan and setting up the Coordinating
Foundation together with British Jews.
[28 March and 15 April
1939: Informal meetings about a future Coordinating
Foundation - danger that the plan is copied by other
governments]
As a result of concerted pressure, a first meeting of
Taylor with Lewis L. Strauss, Henry Ittleson, Albert D.
Lasker, Harold Linder, and Joseph C. Hyman took place on
March 28, 1939. A second "informal meeting of Jews" was
held on April 15.
(End note 143: 9-27, 5/4/39 [4 May 1939] memo)
At this meeting in the chambers of Roosevelt's friend
Judge Rosenman, the leadership of JDC and the American
Jewish Committee, as well as prominent Zionists like Wise
and Robert Szold, decided to negotiate with Taylor. An
aide-mémoire drawn up as a result of the meeting stated
that "we should take no steps that directly or by
implication would give recognition by the Jewish community
as such to the validity of any expropriation of private
property or of the requirement that German citizens who
are Jews (sic!) shall be driven into exile. We should
particularly refrain from undertaking, as a Jewish group,
any step which might tend to induce any other (p.277)
government to follow the German program."
The matter was not just Jewish, and if Taylor insisted on
forming an organization to implement the Rublee plan, this
should be done "under general and not Jewish auspices."
Further, the problem was of such magnitude "as to place it
beyond the power of individuals alone to solve, and to
make it a subject for the concern and active aid of
governments."
Meetings with Taylor followed. Taylor disregarded the
Jewish reservations and chose to regard the Jewish
attitude as favorable to the creation of the Coordinating
Foundation. He agreed with their reservations, he said,
and the foundation should be set up forthwith. But to the
State Department he reported that there was great
reluctance in Jewish circles because of the fear that the
Jews with their own hands, might create that ogre of
anti-Semitic propaganda called "international Jewry",
against which Hitler was rampaging.
[29 April 1939: 41 Jewish
leaders agree to the Schacht-Rublee plan]
But the Jews were already relenting. On April 29 41 Jewish
leaders met and agreed to Taylor's demands. Nevertheless
Roosevelt requested that a Jewish delegation meet with
him.
[4 May 1939: Roosevelt
urges the Jewish leaders to set up the Coordinating
Foundation]
The meeting took place on May 4, with Baerwald, Ittleson,
Strauss, Proskauer, Sol Stroock, and Samuel I. Rosenman
representing the Jews, and Welles and Moffat representing
the State Department. The president urged the Jewish
leaders to set up the foundation as quickly as possible.
[30 May 1939: Two Jewish
"US" representatives should be sent to London to
establish the Coordinating Foundation]
In response, JDC - obviously the Jewish group most
immediately concerned - decided on May 30 to send two
representatives to London to negotiate with the British
regarding the establishment of the foundation. Paul
Baerwald and Harold Linder agreed to go on the delicate
mission.
(End note 144: Executive Committee, 6/16/39 [16 June
1939])
[Supplement: Summary
-- the Jewish side makes it's worldwide boycott of the
Third Reich by boykotting German goods and by a financial
currency boycott
-- in responce the Third Reich is expropriating the German
Jews more and more and making anti-Jewish propaganda
-- so, both sides don't want to recognize each other
->> by this both parts are blocking each other, and
there will be no breakthrough solution].
