[1.8. The
actions of the Joint against poverty of Jews in
Eastern Europe]
[Late 1920s: Eastern
Europe: JDC actions against Jewish poverty]
The activities of JDC in Eastern Europe were motivated by
the desire to avoid relief work as much as possible; the
relatively small sums could not, in any case, alleviate
mass suffering. Work was therefore concentrated on
reconstruction. This found expression in (p.33)
four aspects of JDC activities: medical work, education,
child care, and the provision of cheap credits. (It was
Dr. Kahn's principle not to engage in the latter work
directly but to subsidize those organizations that were
most effective at it).
[1921: Poland: Foundation
of medical organization TOZ - TOZ activities]
As far as the health program was concerned, JDC had
founded TOZ in Poland in 1921. This group of medical
workers and administrators ran their society on the basis
of a dues-paying membership that controlled the
organization, and they demanded certain minimal payment
for a small part of their otherwise free services.
Collections, government subsidies, and JDC subsidies made
up the rest of their budget.
By 1929 TOZ had 63 branches in Poland, with 14,854
members. It provided health education in the form of
lectures, films, and publications. It ran summer camps
("colonies"), anti-TB clinics, dental clinics, and milk
stations for children, and various school programs. (p.34)
(End note 10: TOZ had a medical staff of 397 in 1929. It
ran 31 hospitals, 21 anti-TB clinics, and 26 dental
clinics. JDC contributed 337,000 zloty to its 2 million
zloty budget. In its summer camps there were 7,820
children in 1927, 7,633 in 1928, and 6,427 in 1929.
(p.308)
In the other areas of Eastern Europe, JDC assisted in
reviving the Russian Jewish health organization known as
OSE.
[1912: Russia: Foundation
of medical organization OSE / OZE]
(Footnote: OSE (OZE) - Obshchestvo Zdravookhraneniya
Yevreyev (Society for the Protection of the Health of the
Jews), founded in 1912)
[Since 1919: OSE / OZE:
Creation of a system of health centers in Ukraine,
Baltic states, Danzig, Bessarabia, and Austria]
Despite the fact that this old and well-established group
was now cut off from its former base of operations in
Russia, it continued after the war and was active in the
Ukraine, the Baltic states, Danzig, Bessarabia, and
Austria. In those countries it set up a system of health
centers.
However, it did not attain the singular importance there
that TOZ had in Poland, and Kahn was apt to be rather
critical of what he considered its conservatism.
Nevertheless, OSE did very useful work in its own areas.
[1923: Poland: JDC founds
child care federation CENTOS]
As far as the care of children was concerned, JDC was
instrumental in setting up in 1923 a child care federation
of Poland, known as CENTOS, which engaged in social work
with orphans and poor children, and cooperated with TOZ in
summer camp programs and similar activities.
[1923: Warsaw: JDC founds
school for nurses under Amelia Grunwald - better
economic position of the nurse in whole Poland]
One of the direct achievements of JDC work in Poland was
the establishment of a modern school for nurses in Warsaw
by Amelia Grunwald in 1923. Miss Grunwald was an expert
nurse and an efficient administrator who left her post in
the United States to take (p.34)
over this venture. JDC spent some $ 95,000 on the school
up to 1929 and, as a result, the government and the Warsaw
municipality participated to an ever-increasing extent in
the institute's budget. The school, which was attached to
a municipal hospital treating mainly Jewish patients, had
effected a significant change in the nursing profession in
Poland generally. The nurse had been looked upon as a
somewhat specialized servant of the doctor, but the
school, along with another institution established by the
Rockefeller Foundation, helped to transform her into a
respected member of the medical profession. This found its
expression not merely in a somewhat better economic
position, but mainly in the social standing the nurse
could now hope for. This achievement was a guide to the
kind of pilot project JDC should engage in in other
spheres of activity as well.
[Poland?: JDC supporting
Jewish schools]
Schooling was another area where JDC, in its efforts at
reconstruction, tried to maintain certain institutions so
as to help build a generation of Jewish people who would
be well adapted to the world around them without forgoing
the kind of Jewish education the elders wanted for them.
Subsidies usually came through the three original
constituent organizations of JDC: the Orthodox Central
Committee for the Relief of Jews Suffering through the
War, the socialist People's Relief, and JDC itself, acting
as AJRC [American Joint Relief Committee]. JDC's Cultural
Committee was composed of representatives of these
organizations, and the monies they sent were supposed to
be divided according to a "key" that gave
-- 55 % to the Orthodox,
-- 17.5 % to labor (actually Yiddishist Culture) and
-- 27.5 % to all the rest (Tarbuth Hebrew schools,
assimilationist schools, and some religious schools not
supported by the Central Committee).
This rather lopsided arrangement, which prevailed till the
early 1930s, was a reflection of a European mentality
rather than an American one, and superseded the
arrangement of 1920 whereby each of the three groups
supported, more or less independently, its own
institutions. Government education was either inaccessible
or anti-Jewish, or both; as a result, about half the
Jewish pupils went to Jewish schools.
(End note 11:
There were 540 Orthodox schools for boys and 148 (Beth
Yaacov) schools for girls, with over 81,000 pupils (the
girls received only ten hours of schooling a week);
Orthodox yeshivoth had 18,298 pupils, and evening classes
were visited by another 6,700 - a total of over 106,000
pupils. The 471 Hebrew-oriented Tarbuth schools had 44,370
pupils, and 210 Yiddishist schools had 19,500 pupils;
altogether some 170,000 pupils visited Jewish schools (see
Executive Committee, 12/4/30 [4 December 1930]).
[Since 1924: Poland: JDC
founds the American Jewish Reconstruction Foundation -
the loan kassas]
However, the main effort of Dr. Kahn was directed toward
(p.35)
economic reconstruction. To this end, the Reconstruction
Committee of JDC had joined forces in 1924 with ICA to
establish the American Jewish Reconstruction Foundation,
which was run by the two organizations with Kahn (for JDC)
and Dr. Louis Oungre (for ICA) as managing directors. The
governing body of the foundation was composed of six
members from each of the two founding organizations, and
eight members who were supposed to be responsible Jewish
leaders representing the Jews of Poland, Lithuania, and
Bessarabia. The list included some labor representatives,
some representatives of merchant circles, an Orthodox Jew,
and a Palestine Zionist. But both the Orthodox member
(Jacob Trockenheim) and the Zionist (Berl Locker) failed
to put in appearances at the foundation council meetings.
The main task of the foundation was conceived to be the
establishment of cooperative credit institutions known as
"loan
kassas".
These kassas would call for the payment of share capital,
accept savings and deposits (to a certain extent), and
lend money at a reasonably low rate of interest, mainly to
Jewish merchants and artisans. The idea behind this
movement was that the merchants - actually petty traders -
and artisans, who constituted the overwhelming majority of
the Jewish population in Poland and East European
countries, were suffering from a lack of cheap credit. If
financed in a conservative and businesslike way, they
would not only be able to compete with non-Jews, but would
also regain their self-respect as useful members of their
community. With the help of political bodies, including
some of the Zionists and the Bundists, (p.36)
Table 1: Kassas of
the Reconstruction Foundation
|
Year
|
No. of kassas
|
No. of members
|
New foundation
investments (net)
|
1929
|
747
|
310,000
|
$ 246,000
|
1930
|
768
|
321,000
|
$ 865,000
|
[Foundation of the
Verband to control individual kassas]
a central federation known as the Verband was set up to
exercise control over individual
kassas, and a bank was established to
serve as the financial instrument. This economic movement
was undoubtedly popular.
[1924-1926: Poland: The
effect of the kassas: Help only for credit-worthy Jews]
Well over a third of the Jewish population in Poland were
reached by the kassas. The loans were small, averaging
about $ 50, and were usually repaid on time; cases of
defaulting debtors were relatively few. However, these
kassas only reached
that portion of the Jewish population that was still
credit-worthy, if only to a limited degree; it was quite
clear that the poorer groups could not be included in this
venture. Yet ICA did not see its way clear to supporting
something akin to relief for these people.
[1926: Poland: Kahn
establishes kassas with mercy and credit without
interest rate: Free Loan kassas / Kassas Gemiluth
chessed - popularity of the Joint]
Kahn, representing JDC, looked for some kind of solution,
and in 1926 he established in Poland a series of
institutions with the traditional name of Free Loan, or
Gemiluth Chessed,
kassas
Gemiluth chessed (giving of mercy) was the
traditional term for almsgiving. However, in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the term was
expanded to include interest-free loans. Kahn now enlarged
on this notion and established credit societies that would
grant very small loans in large numbers at a nominal rate
of interest, or no interest at all. Here again share
capital was invited, but the low-interest JDC credits
covered a much greater part of the needs of these
kassas than they did
of the loan
kassas.
The Free Loan kassas apparently filled a crying need. By
1930 there were 545 of them in Poland, with 100,000
members. The total resources came to $ 1.1 million, of
which $ 665,000 had been invested by JDC. A traditional
concept had successfully been adapted to a modern
situation, and as a result the popularity of the Joint
among Polish Jews increased considerably.
[Since 1926: JDC Kahn
looks for definite solutions - plan for the
industrialization of Polish Jewry]
All these ventures alleviated Jewish suffering to a
considerable degree, and were vastly important in the
lives of the millions of Jews in Poland. However, Kahn was
too much of a realist not to see that he had not really
touched the core of the Jewish economic problem. The
kassas were really no more than an instrument to soften
the economic blows from which the Jews were suffering to
(p.37)
an ever-increasing degree. It was quite obvious that the
poorest of the poor - a third of Polish Jewry - could not
benefit even from the Free Loan
kassas. To spend the precious dollars
for outright relief would not only be degrading but also
futile. Could anything be done to change the situation and
give Poland's Jews a real chance to rebuild their economic
lives?
Kahn very clearly thought that with purposeful action on
the part of American Jewry, Polish Jewry could be so
changed as to adapt itself to the society now emerging in
Poland. In the summer of 1929 he appeared before the
leadership of JDC in Zurich, while the Jewish Agency
discussions were being held there, to propose a plan for
the industrialization of Polish Jewry.
[1929: Kahn's plan for
industrialization of the Polish Jewry]
There were several aspects to Kahn's plan. He thought that
Poland was going to be industrialized and that
anti-Semitism would not be powerful enough to blind Polish
statesmen to the interdependence of Polish Jewry and the
Polish economy. Therefore, it might be possible to
interest the government in a scheme that would integrate
the Jews into the economy. He assumed that there would be
a steady stream of American money at the rate of about $
1.1 million yearly for five years; properly applied, this
not very large sum could work wonders.
Also, Kahn considered emigration to be no solution and
felt that the problems of Polish Jews would have to be
solved in Poland.
Another assumption was that the program would be
implemented by American Jewry acting through JDC - in
fact, through Kahn. He does not seem to have considered
the possibility of any participation in planning or
direction by Polish Jews themselves. He also insisted with
great clarity and conviction that no planning was possible
except on a minimal five-year basis, with funds that would
insure the fulfillment of that first stage. This is what
had been done for Russia, and Kahn obviously relied on the
experience gained there in his attempt to deal with Polish
Jewry.
Given these assumptions, Kahn proceeded to outline his
plan.
We must try to create a
healthier economic structure of the Jewish masses and do
away with the present competition among (p.38)
the various classes of Jews, create an economic
situation which is so constructed that the various
groups can rely on one another: the workman on the
artisan, the tradesman on the industrialist, etc., in
which the individual parts supplement one another
economically.
But a sudden radical change of the economic structure is
not possible. The chief occupation of the Jews will be
the same for many years to come. Industry, trade,
commerce, crafts, professions, in which 70-80 % of the
Jews are employed, will continue to be the basis of
their earnings.
These professions must be regulated, competition
decreased in the smaller industries, and production
adjusted. Trade is not systematic, there is no order or
calculation in business, the crafts are one-sided, some
branches overcrowded, there is too little variety and
not enough specialization, and lastly the artisans have
not had sufficient training and are using old-fashioned
methods.
When we talk about the "restratification of the masses"
we must not only try to create new professions in which
a large number of Jews can be employed, but also
rearrange all professions. Great numbers will be
excluded in industrial branches and trade, although we
are going to do everything possible to maintain the
Jewish economic position in trade and industry. Those
who are thus excluded may find positions as employees.
A regeneration of Jewish trade and industry will bring
about normal conditions for employees. Everywhere now
employees are taking the place of the independent small
tradesman and industrialist. The number of employees is
increasing rapidly, much more rapidly in proportion than
the number of laborers. ...
Another means of adjusting larger masses of Jews to the
new economic order is to be found in industrialization.
As yet, there are comparatively few Jewish factory
workmen and industrial labor men, who did work at home
for factories and workshops and worked in small
workshops. They are not mechanics. The progress of the
machine has left these workmen unemployed, prevents more
Jewish workmen from obtaining employment. Artisans too
must find employment in shops where machines are in use
if they wish to secure any employment at all.
It is well known that the Jewish workman, especially the
Jewish industrial worker and factory worker, is
unemployed. It is further known that the masses of
Jewish workers are not mechanics and that in "the
shifting of the masses" it is absolutely necessary to
place larger groups of Jewish workmen in industry and
factories.
With our small means we have made a start in Lodz. Here
together with Jewish manufacturers, we have taken over a
small (p.39)
textile factory in which we employ workmen and are
placing Jewish weavers at machine work, who, after a
short period of training, go out into Jewish factories,
so that there is a continual training of Jewish workmen
going on. ...
If we are able to continue the organizing of this work,
I believe that after a few years we will have
strengthened the position of the Jews to such an extent
that a gradual prosperity for them will set in.
(End note 12: File 42, 7/10/29 [10 July 1929])
The financial requirements were very modest; apart from
Kahn's normal budget, which would go into very much the
same type of work as before, he would require $ 625,000
annually to proceed with a minimum program embodying his
proposals: mainly, the organization of factories operated
by Jewish employers who would train Jewish youngsters to
become factory workers.
Kahn's industrialization plan was an imaginative attempt
to tackle the economic problem of the Jewish masses by
modern means and in line with the developing economy of
Eastern Europe. It was bold, it was based on a set of hard
facts, and it would be in the hands of a first-class
administrator and economic expert.
[November 1929: Stock
market crash in New York destroys all plans - Polish
anti-Semitism would have blocked the plan - question of
a market for Jewish products]
But the plan never got off the ground because at the end
of 1929 the Great Depression set in. However, it is
doubtful whether the plan had any real chance to succeed.
It assumed too blandly that anti-Semitism was an economic
phenomenon, that if Polish Jewry was helped, then the
benefits accruing to Polish society would neutralize
anti-Jewish feeling among the population and the
government alike. Without the help - or at least the
benevolent neutrality - of the Polish government, it was
unthinkable that the project could succeed.
More important, the project assumed that one could remold
the Jewish economy in Poland without at the same time
remolding the Polish economy as well. This seems to have
been a fallacy - and JDC was not really strong enough,
even in a time of prosperity, to tackle the whole of
Poland. Also, Kahn thought that by proper export
arrangements Jewish production would find a market. This
was an assumption based on the existence of boom
conditions in the U.S. and elsewhere. But in Europe, 1929
was not a very good (p.40)
year, and we have already mentioned the crop failures in
the East that had diminished the purchasing power of the
peasantry. If the position of the peasantry was not
improved, who would buy the Jewish products - or any other
products for that matter?
[Russia: Absorption of
Soviet Jewry - Kahn's plan for Jews in Poland would have
functioned only with an expanding economy]
The success of the economic absorption of Soviet Jewry a
couple of years later was a good guideline to the
possibilities in other countries. In Soviet Russia the
solution of the economic problem came when Jews were
accepted as laborers in a swiftly expanding economy
suffering from a labor shortage. Without an expanding
economy, however, it is difficult to see how Kahn's
industrialization plan could have worked in Poland. Yet
this has to be remembered: of all those who made an effort
to find a solution to the Polish Jewish problem, Kahn came
nearest to a positive and practical approach. It was not
his fault that his program never materialized.